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1 
PROPERTIZING FAIR USE 
Abraham Bell  and Gideon Parchomovsky  
ABSTRACT 
In its current form, fair use doctrine provides a personal defense 
that applies narrowly to the specific use by the specific user. The 
landmark case of Google v. Oracle, currently pending before the 
Supreme Court, illustrates why this is problematic. Even if the Court 
were to rule that Google’s use of Oracle’s Java API’s was fair, the 
ruling would not protect the numerous parties that developed Java 
applications for the Android operating system; it would only shelter 
Google and Google’s particular use. This is not an isolated problem; 
the per use/per user rule cuts across fair uses of copyrighted works, 
and it always leaves follow-on users in the cold. Authors, musicians, 
documentary filmmakers and media outlets who win fair use cases 
cannot freely market their works that incorporate fair use content since 
their victories do not carry over to other users. Fair use under extant 
law is a very limited privilege. 
This Article proposes a far-reaching reform not only of copyright 
law as applied to software, but of the fair use doctrine itself. Our 
proposal consists of three interlocking elements. First, we call for the 
introduction of a new in rem conception of fair use, under which a fair 
use ruling would serve as a property remedy that shelters all 
subsequent users of works that fairly incorporate preexisting materials. 
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Under this new conception, a finding of fair use would run with that 
new work like an easement to all other distributors, broadcasters, 
publishers, performers and others who use it. The introduction of this 
new type of in rem fair use would result in the division of fair use into 
two conceptions—one in rem and one in personam—that would co-
exist alongside one another. Second, we would grant judges discretion 
to decide which fair use conception, if any, should be granted in any 
particular case. Judges would be able to employ the traditional in 
personam rule that the fair use avails only the specific defendant before 
it, or they could adopt an in rem fair use ruling, creating a property 
entitlement that runs with the work embodying the fairly incorporated 
content. Third, we propose two default rules to assist judges in making 
their decisions. Specifically, we propose that the default setting of fair 
use would depend on the type of use being examined. Where the 
claimed fair use consists of incorporating the protected copyrighted 
material in a new copyrighted work—such as the Android operating 
system—the default fair use would be of the in rem variety. However, 
in all other cases of claimed fair use, the traditional, familiar in 
personam conception would be the default setting. This approach 
would create clarity about the status of follow-on fair uses, but permit 
judges to tailor their rulings case by case. 
Implementation of our proposal would yield several significant 
improvements to the current fair use doctrine. It would permit judges 
to take account of the potential for future uses of the fair use work, 
without handcuffing them to a single approach. Moreover, it would 
increase certainty with respect to the use of copyrighted work by 
lowering transaction and litigation costs for creators of new works. 
Finally, the version of fair use we advocate would enhance the use of 
copyrighted content. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fair use is one of the most celebrated doctrines in the law.1 It is 
widely seen as a key component of the law of copyright, balancing 
the exclusive rights of copyright owners with the public interest in 
the use and enjoyment of works after their creation.2 It is not only 
the most significant and most capacious defense against copyright 
infringement;3 it is also, according to the Supreme Court, an 
indispensable part of the Constitutional balance between freedom 
of speech and protected copyrighted expression.4 Unsurprisingly, 
the fair use doctrine has attracted considerable academic attention 
and has been the subject of discussion and debate.5 Yet, a critical 
 
1 See Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 
(1982); Wendy J. Gordon & Daniel Bahls, The Public's Right to Fair Use: 
Amending Section 107 to Avoid the "Fared Use" Fallacy, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 
619, 620 (2007); William Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 1661 (1988); Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright 
Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PENN. L. REV 549 (2008); Pamela 
Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009); Pamela 
Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 815 (2015); Rebecca 
Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How 
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L. J. 535 (2004); Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair 
Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 (2007); Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO 
ST. L. J. 47 (2011); Jeanne C. Fromer, Market Effects Bearing on Fair Use, 90 
WASH. L. REV. 615 (2015); Abraham Bell; Gideon Parchomovsky, The Dual-
Grant Theory of Fair Use, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (2016) [hereinafter The 
Dual-Grant Theory of Fair Use] (“Fair use is a keystone of the law of copyright 
. . . .”); Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 
1110 (1990) (“[T]he function of fair use [i]s integral to copyright's objectives . . 
. .”). 
2 Stephen McIntyre, Private Rights and Public Wrongs: Fair Use As A Remedy 
for Private Censorship, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 61, 64 (2013) (“The ‘fair use’ doctrine 
. . . balances copyright holders' rights against the public's interests in free speech 
and the dissemination of knowledge, information, and culture.”); Niva Elkin-
Koren & Orit Fischman-Afori, Rulifying Fair Use, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 161, 199 
(2017) (“Fair use was first crafted as a legal standard . . . intending to allow courts 
to reconcile the copyright of authors with the public interest.”). 
3 See The Dual-Grant Theory of Fair Use, supra note 1 (“The fair use defense to 
copyright infringement is perhaps the most frequently raised and litigated defense 
in the law of intellectual property.”); Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, supra note 1 at 
1089 (2007) (“Fair use is the first and most general of these limitations.”). Unlike 
other defenses that apply to infringements of specific rights, e.g., reproduction, 
public performance, public display, fair use offers protection against all 
violations of all rights. 
4 Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012); Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 US 186, 219-20 
(2003) (describing fair use as a "built-in First Amendment accommodation[I"); 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc v Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539, 555-60 (1985) 
(describing the "First Amendment protections . . . embodied in . . . the latitude 
for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use"). 
5 See supra note 1. 
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aspect of the doctrine has not been analyzed to date. And it goes to 
the core of the fair use doctrine. 
There is a sharp asymmetry between the design of the exclusive 
rights granted to authors under the copyright act and the design of 
the fair use defense intended to protect user interests. The 
asymmetry is found in copyright’s protection of works, as opposed 
to fair use’s protection of uses. Copyright protects a list of rights in 
a particular work allocated to the owner of the copyright, 6 whereas 
the fair use defense only pertains to a specific use by a particular 
user.7 Put differently, fair use is an agent-specific defense that is 
analyzed on a use by use basis. The fair use defense does not and 
cannot offer prophylactic immunity for using the work; it does not 
carry over to similar uses by the same user or identical uses by other 
users. As a result, the doctrine of fair use is far narrower than is 
generally appreciated. 
To see why this is a problem, consider the case of Oracle 
America, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,8 currently pending before the 
Supreme Court. Oracle v. Google concerns Google’s use of Java 
APIs in the programming language used in Android phones. Oracle 
claimed that Google violated its copyright in the specific Java 
commands.9 In its defense, Google claimed that the commands were 
insufficiently original to warrant copyright protection,10 and that 
even if the commands were sufficiently original, other doctrines 
blocked copyright protection.11 Google’s claim won at the trial 
court level.12 However, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed, determining that Java APIs are copyrighted, and it 
remanded the case to the trial court for examination of Google’s fair 
use defense.13 Back in the trial court, Google claimed that its use of 
the Java commands in the programming language for Android 
phones was a fair use,14 and again Google won at the trial level.15 
 
6 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the 
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following . . . .”), with 17 U.S.C. 
§ 107 (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of 
copyright.”). 
7 Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
347, 362 (2005) (“In most fair use cases, the identity of the user is known, the use 
has already been made, and the only question is whether or not it passes muster.”).  
8 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2018). For an 
important analysis of the Oracle v. Google litigation, see Peter S. Menell, API 
Copyrightability Bleak House: Unraveling and Repairing the Oracle v. Google 
Jurisdictional Mess, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1515 (2016). 




13 United Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
14 2016 WL 3181206 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2016). 
15 Id. 
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Once more, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the jury 
decision, and it ordered the trial court to proceed to the remedies 
phase.16 As of this writing, the Supreme Court has granted 
certiorari, but it has not yet heard the case.17 
Consider what would happen if Google’s fair use defense were 
ultimately to prevail (as many commentators believe it should18). 
The fair use defense would establish that Google’s use of the Java 
commands in its operating system for Android phones is 
permissible notwithstanding a prima facie violation of Oracle’s 
exclusive copyright rights in the Java APIs.19 However, given the 
way the fair use defense works today, no other company that 
programmed for the Android phone could be sure that its use of the 
Java commands would be considered a fair use. The fair use defense 
would only shelter Google’s use. Indeed, even Google could not be 
sure that any future Google use of Oracle’s Java APIs would be 
permitted. Google could only be confident that the particular uses 
considered in the case were fair uses; any other use of the Java 
commands in a different program, or use of different Java APIs in 
the same program would potentially be vulnerable to an 
infringement suit. 
A similar problem arises in other contexts, from music to 
literature. 2 Live Crew famously won a Supreme Court victory in 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose20 on a claim of fair use, allowing it to 
continue to use portions of the melody of Roy Orbison’s song “Oh 
Pretty Woman” in its parody “Pretty Woman.” However, a different 
user who wishes to use 2 Live Crew’s song in another context—for 
 
16 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
17 Google LLC v. Oracle America Inc., SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
BLOG (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/google-llc-v-
oracle-america-inc/. 
18 See e.g., Menell, supra note 8, at 1517 (noting that the case “has significant 
ramifications for much of the software industry.”); Don Clark & Cari Tuna, 
Oracle Suit Challenges Google–Silicon Valley Giants Tangle Over Patents, 
Copyrights Involving Open Programs Android and Java, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 
2010, at B1 (reporting that the litigation “set off shock waves in the Silicon Valley 
software community”).  Some of Google’s biggest rivals are taking its side in a 
Supreme Court battle, Jan 14, 2020 available at: 
https://www.theverge.com/2020/1/14/21059180/oracle-google-supreme-court-
copyright-lawsuit-amicus-brief-filings . See also: Why Google’s fair use victory 
over Oracle matters, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/31/google-fair-use-victory-
oracle-software-androids 
19 See HORACE G BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 
(1944) ("Fair use is technically an infringement of copyright, but is allowed by 
law on the ground that the appropriation is reasonable and customary."); Ned 
Snow, The Forgotten Right of Fair Use, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 135, 141 (2011) 
(“Fair use now represents an excuse to justify infringement, or in other words, an 
exception to the norm of speech suppression through copyright.”). 
20 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
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example by incorporating it as background music in a film, or 
performing the song at a high school dance—is barred from doing 
so even if she were to secure permission from 2 Live Crew.21 The 
Supreme Court’s ruling that 2 Live Crew’s use is fair does not mean 
that the subsequent use would be deemed fair too. Similarly, if a 
screenwriter wanted to produce a movie based on Alice Randall’s 
book “The Wind Done Gone,” and she properly purchased rights 
from Alice Randall, she, too, would not be readily able to embark 
upon this task. Although Alice Randall’s use of Margaret Mitchell’s 
“Gone With the Wind,” was ruled to be fair,22 every subsequent user 
of her work would be exposed to an infringement claim unless she 
secured a license from the owners of “Gone with the Wind,” who, 
as one may recall, refused to license Alice Randall’s use. Fair use 
findings are in personam; they only pertain to a specific user. 
Copyright protection, by contrast, is in rem; it avails against the rest 
of the world.23 This creates a vast amount of uncertainty. 
In this Article, we propose a dramatic reformation of the fair 
use doctrine consisting of three complementary steps. First, we 
introduce a new conception of fair use, under which fair use could 
constitute an in rem, property remedy. This new conception of fair 
use would supplement rather than supplant the existing fair use 
doctrine. Under the new in rem property conception, a fair use 
finding would assist not only the particular defendant who raised 
the fair use defense, but also all subsequent users of the work that 
had been found to fairly incorporate copyright content. Thus, the in 
rem version of fair use would take on the form of a property incident 
that benefits all future users, and it would therefore enhance the 
marketability of follow-on works employing the fair use. 
Second, we would grant courts the power to decide which 
conception of fair use, if any, to adopt in each case. Upon a finding 
of fair use, the judge could adopt either the traditional in personam 
version or our new in rem version of fair use. Judges would not be 
 
21 The industry practice for obtaining licenses for musical performance is 
sufficiently well-developed and complex that the would-be user would likely be 
able to obtain the relevant licenses without direct communication with either 
Campbell (who owns the rights to 2 Live Crew’s song) or Acuff Rose (who owns 
the rights to Orbison’s). For purposes of our example, we ignore the industry 
practice. 
22 See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1277 (11th Cir. 
2001) (concluding that “a viable fair use defense is available” for The Wind Done 
Gone’s potential infringement of Suntrust’s copyright in Gone With the Wind). 
23 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three 
Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1070 (2008) (“[P]roperty rights, as defined 
by the government, are rights in rem, which avail against the world . . . .”); Guy 
Pessach, Toward A New Jurisprudence of Copyright Exemptions, 55 IDEA 287, 
291 (2015) (“Copyright owners' entitlements are in rem exclusive property rights 
. . . owners have the right to exclude the rest of the world from utilizing their 
copyrighted works for uses that fall within their bundle of exclusive uses.”). 
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required to adopt the in rem version of fair use in every case. In 
appropriate circumstances, the judge could stick to the traditional 
approach to fair use, limiting it to the specific user and the specific 
use. The upshot of our proposal would be a legal menu with three 
options: denying fair use, finding an in personam fair use, or finding 
an in rem fair use. 
Third, we propose a set of default rules for all fair use cases. 
Where judges choose not to specify whether their finding of fair use 
is of the in personam or in rem variety, we propose that default rules 
make that decision. However, the default setting of fair use would 
depend on the type of use being examined. Specifically, where the 
claimed fair use consists of incorporating the protected copyrighted 
material in a new copyrighted work—such as the Android operating 
system, or the “Pretty Woman” song—the default fair use would be 
of the in rem variety. In such cases, if the judge failed to specify 
otherwise, future users of the fair use follow-on work could utilize 
that work without having to relitigate the issue of infringement with 
the owner of the original copyrighted work. However, in all other 
cases of claimed fair use, the traditional, familiar in personam 
conception of fair use would be the default setting. This set of 
default rules would create clarity about the status of follow-on fair 
uses, but permit judges to tailor their rulings case by case. 
We propose that the result of a successful invocation of an in 
rem fair use defense should create effects like those in the world of 
property. Under our suggested interpretation, where the judge 
chooses the in rem variety of fair use, a fair use ruling in favor of 
any particular user would continue to run with the work for the 
benefit of subsequent users with respect to the relevant content 
covered by the ruling. Specifically, any unlicensed incorporation of 
copyrighted material that was ruled a fair use would be seen as 
creating a permanent copyright defense that runs with the work, 
akin to a property easement. Were a court to rule that a particular 
user made fair use of a preexisting work, subsequent users of the 
follow-on work that was found to “fairly use” preexisting material 
would also be protected by the ruling. These subsequent users could 
utilize the preexisting material in the follow-on work with assurance 
that their use too would be deemed “fair.” For example, if Google’s 
use of Oracle’s Java APIs is ultimately ruled a fair use, on the view 
we expound, and if the trial judge ultimately were to rule the fair 
use an in rem fair use, not only Google but every Android user who 
uses Google’s APIs will be sheltered from liability, even though the 
Google APIs incorporate Oracle’s. 
Our proposal has three significant advantages relative to extant 
fair use doctrine. First, our proposal would increase certainty with 
respect to the use of copyrighted work. Currently, a fair use finding 
only helps the named defendants in the case. It does not pertain to 
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other users, who wish to make the same use of the copyrighted 
work. Under current law, other users either have to take their 
chances in court or negotiate a license from the owner.24 The 
adoption of our proposal would allow judges in fair use cases to put 
other potential users on solid ground by allowing them to engage in 
the same use that was ruled fair. At the same time, our approach 
would permit tailoring remedies to the needs of the fair use. Judges 
could take account of the potential for future uses of the fair use 
work, and deny future in rem employment of a fair use remedy, 
where appropriate. The default settings of fair use would create 
clarity about the meaning of fair use decisions in any particular case 
where the judge chose not to elaborate. 
Second, our proposal would potentially lower transaction and 
litigation costs for creators of new works.25 As we explained, 
current doctrine requires users of works that fairly incorporate 
materials from preexisting works to negotiate licenses from both the 
original owner and the fair user, or plead their own new fair use in 
court. Both options are costly. Our proposal potentially alleviates 
this burden, conserving judicial resources while lowering costs for 
the parties themselves. 
Third, and finally, our proposal would increase the productive 
use of copyrighted content. The sheltering principle would enable 
multiple downstream users to create new works that incorporate 
past works that were found by courts to make fair uses of older 
works. 
The remainder of the Article unfolds in three parts. In Part I, 
we explicate the shortcomings of extant fair use doctrine, focusing 
on the inherent limitations arising from fair use’s understanding as 
a personal, use-specific defense to copyright infringement. In 
particular, we discuss the costs that current fair use jurisprudence 
imposes on follow-on creators. In Part II, we turn to the world of 
property, where one finds such doctrines as market overt and the 
law of easements that promote the marketability of rights and give 
use rights an in rem character. In Part III, we draw on our discussion 
of property law to call for the introduction of a brand new 
conception of fair use that would operate as a property incident in 
the sense that it would benefit all subsequent users of a work that 
obtained a fair use status. Finally, in Part IV, we provide an 
important context for our amended understanding of fair use by 
showing that other parts of the law of copyright that struggle with 
 
24 See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property 
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 890 (2007) (stating that since the fair use doctrine is 
ambiguous and the cost of losing an infringement case is prohibitively high, 
“even a risk-neutral actor with a good fair use claim would choose to secure a 
license rather than take the small risk of incurring a severe penalty”). 
25 For discussion, see infra, Part I.B.  
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similar problems have employed mechanisms that bear a great deal 
of resemblance to our proposal. 
I. THE LIMITATIONS OF FAIR USE DOCTRINE TODAY 
A. Extant Fair Use Law 
Fair use is an equitable defense to copyright infringement, 
originally developed judicially, despite the statutory origins of 
copyright.26 Importantly for our purposes, fair use is highly 
contextualized. Section 107 of the Copyright Act, in which the 
modern fair use doctrine is enshrined, provides courts with two 
anchors in making fair use determinations27 The preamble of 
section 107 gives courts a non-exhaustive list of presumptively fair 
uses such as criticism, news reporting, comment, teaching, research 
and scholarship.28 Courts may use this list to determine if the use at 
hand falls within one of the enumerated categories of “fair” uses. 
The latter part of Section 107 gives courts four factors to consider 
and balance in making their final decision on fair use. Section 107 
instructs courts to consider: (1) the purpose of the allegedly 
infringing use (2) the nature of the copyrighted work allegedly 
being infringed; (3) the amount and substantiality of the 
copyrighted material taken by the allegedly infringing use; and (4) 
the effect of a fair use finding on the actual and potential value for 
the allegedly infringed upon copyrighted work.29 
In construing the statutory criteria, courts, at different times, 
have weighted certain factors more heavily than others. At present, 
courts tend to focus on the transformativeness of the claimed fair 
use when compared to the original work, leading courts to pay 
particular attention to the purpose of the defendant’s use and the 
use’s effect on the value of the copyrighted work—statutory factors 
1 and 4 respectively.30 That said, fair use cases are notoriously 
difficult to rationalize; as Pamela Samuelson has shown, fair use 
rules are highly context-dependent, and it is difficult to summarize 
all fair use law in a single approach.31 
Fair use is probably the most celebrated doctrine in the law of 
copyright and often the fulcrum on which authors’ rights and users’ 
 
26 Gideon Parchomovsky, Fair Use, Efficiency and Corrective Justice, 3 LEG. 
THEORY. 347, 350 (1997) (“The doctrine of fair use originated in the decisions of 
the English Law and Equity courts”).  
27 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Stephen B. Thau, Copyright, Privacy, and Fair Use, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 179, 
189 (1995) (“the Court has emphasized that the fourth factor- the potential market 
value of the plaintiff’s work- is to receive the most weight.”). 
31 Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009).  
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interests are balanced against ethach other. Yet, by virtue of the fair 
use doctrine current design, it has only a limited ability to ensure 
broad use of works. As it stands, the fair use doctrine provides a 
very limited privilege, or shelter, to users. 
Fair use findings are individualized in two central ways: per 
user and per use. Take the example of a blogger who excerpts a 
short quotation from a copyrighted political speech as part of a blog 
entry on politics. If a court were to find this use “fair,” this finding 
would necessarily be confined to the specific blogger and her 
individual circumstances. If subsequently, a mainstream media 
outlet were to quote exactly the same words from the same 
copyrighted political speech in its own news report, the mainstream 
media outlet could not be certain that its own use would be 
considered a fair use. Indeed, even if the mainstream media outlet 
secured permission from the blogger to utilize the entire blog entry, 
and its only use of the quotation were in the context of reprinting 
the blog entry in its entirety, the media outlet would still need to 
negotiate its own license from the writer of the speech, or make its 
own, separate claim of fair use over the quote. The same is true for 
other online users. They, too, could not reproduce, adapt or circulate 
the content of the blog even the blogger’s permission. The blogger’s 
fair use finding would be of no avail to them. Their use would not 
be part of the blogger’s fair use. 
No less importantly, even the original blogger who won a court 
ruling in favor of her fair use of the quotation in her blog entry could 
not be sure that the use would still be fair if she then adapted her 
blog entry into something else. For example, if she were to turn the 
blog entry into a book chapter, or she were to add accompanying 
video of the speech to the original blog entry, or she were to add a 
few words to the quotation, she would again expose herself to a risk 
of copyright liability. While the use of the copyright content in a 
particular literary form was ruled fair, it does mean that its 
incorporation into a different literary form, or a different 
copyrighted non-literary form would qualify as fair, as well. 
Accordingly, if in the famous Supreme Court case Harper & 
Row v. Nation Enterprises,32 the Supreme Court had found the 
Nation’s quotations from Gerald Ford’s autobiography “Time to 
Heal” fair (which it did not, of course), other magazines and 
reporters could still not reproduce the content of the Nation’s article 
even with permission from the magazine. The fair use ruling would 
not pertain to them. 
This inherent limitation of fair use is especially problematic in 
this day and age in which information moves through 
 
32 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc v Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539 (1985). 
PRELIMINARY PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT, FORTHCOMING 107 VA. L. REV. (2021) 
 © 2021, Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky 2/9/2021 
Propertizing Fair Use 
12 
interconnected networks.33 As many scholars have noted, the norm 
among internet users is to share content instantaneously.34 It is 
unreasonable to expect users to understand the fine details of 
copyright law. There is little reason to suspect that users will have 
any idea that content that was uploaded lawfully based on a fair use 
finding may not be further downloaded and further distributed by 
them. Paradoxically, fair use findings can become a trap to the 
unwary. They “clear” rights for a single user who was sued and 
prevailed in court, allowing her to continue to use the content in the 
particular manner authorized by the court, but have no effect on 
other users. 
This shortcoming of fair use can be seen in the most dramatic 
way in the case of Oracle v. Google,35 currently pending before the 
Supreme Court, and widely recognized as a critically important fair 
use case.36 The matter was brought to court after Oracle accused 
Google of copying 37 packages in one of its Application 
Programming Interfaces (“API”).37 APIs can be defined for 
simplicity’s sake as code orders that enable interfaces between 
programs.38 Oracle’s predecessor, Sun Microsystems, had 
developed a programming language called Java that included a 
number of elements including the Java API. Google incorporated 
the structure and organization of the contested API into the Android 
operating system.39 As part of the process, Google rewrote the Java 
API, but many of the commands in the Android API remained 
 
33 LARRY LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID 
ECONOMY (2008).  
34 See e.g., Ben Depoorter, Alain Van Hiel, and Sven Vanneste, Copyright 
Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (2011) (“Sharing unlicensed 
copyrighted materials is now a part of teenagers' everyday lives;”); Madhavi 
Sunder, IP³, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 263 (2006) (observing that we are living in 
the “‘Participation Age’ of remix culture, blogs, podcasts, wikis, and peer-to-peer 
file-sharing. This new generation views intellectual properties as the raw 
materials for its own creative acts, blurring the lines that have long separated 
producers from consumers.”); John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright 
Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 547 (pointing out that 
digital technology has enabled unparalleled manipulation and use of creative 
works by ordinary individuals.”). 
35 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc, 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
36 See e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Clark D. Asay, Saving Software’s Fair Use 
Future, 31 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 535, 536-7 (2018) (“How the Federal Circuit 
decides Oracle's appeal of a jury verdict in favor of Google's fair use defense will 
have significant implications for future software copyright fair use cases because 
Oracle, in effect, calls into question the viability of fair use defenses in all API 
reuse cases (and perhaps in software cases more generally.”). 
37 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc, 750 F.3d 1339, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
38 See United States v Microsoft Corp, 253 F.3d 34, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(“Operating systems also function as platforms for software applications. They 
do this by ‘exposing’… routines or protocols that perform certain widely used 
functions. These are known as Application Programming Interfaces, or APIs.” 
39 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc, 750 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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identical to the Java API.40 
It should be noted that the Java API was originally developed 
by Sun Microsystems, and that Sun, as opposed to Oracle, originally 
allowed, and even encouraged, Google to use the API and other 
elements of Java.41 It was only after ownership of the copyright in 
the API was transferred to Oracle that a clash arose, and Oracle sued 
Google for copyright infringement.42 The case proceeded in two 
rounds. The first round concentrated on the eligibility of APIs for 
copyright protection. The District Court for the Northern District of 
California ruled that APIs were uncopyrightable as “there is only 
one way to declare a given method functionality, [so that] everyone 
using that function must write that specific line of code in the same 
way.”43 Citing various copyright doctrines ranging from the judicial 
“merger” doctrine to the statutory exclusion of “methods of 
operation,” the court determined that the challenged parts of the 
code were outside the scope of copyright protection.44 The Federal 
Circuit reversed, ruling that APIs were entitled to copyright 
protection.45 Google’s petition for certiorari was denied.46 
This gave rise to the second round of litigation, revolving 
around the issue of fair use. In 2016, a unanimous jury agreed that 
Google’s use of the API qualified as a fair use.47 To the dismay of 
many commentators,48 the Federal Circuit reversed the decision 
again, holding that Google’s use was not fair as a matter of law.49 
At the time of this writing, Google’s petition for a writ of certiorari 
has been accepted and the case is pending before the Supreme 
Court.50 
If the Supreme Court ultimately finds Google’s use fair, it will 
relieve Google of liability. However, the ruling will not shelter all 
the other technology companies that use Google’s Java APIs in their 
apps written for Android phones. The Android operating system is 
employed in such a large number of applications that any attempt 
to estimate that number would be a mere conjecture. A favorable 
decision for Google does not carry over to any of the other 
companies that use the code. Of course, it will serve as a precedent 
 
40 Id. 
41 Id at 1349. 
42 Id at 1351. 
43 Oracle America Inc. v. Google Inc. 872 F.Supp.2d 974, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
44 Id. at 1002. 
45 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc, 750 F.3d 1339, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
46 Google, Inc. v Oracle America, Inc. 135 S.Ct. 2887 (cert den’d). 
47 Oracle America Inc., v Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1185 (2018). 
48 See, e.g., Ieva Giedrimaite, No Allies for Oracle’s Win against Google, The 
IPKat, March 25, 2019, available at http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/03/no-
allies-for-oracles-win-against-google.html <last visited August 15, 2019>. 
49 Oracle America Inc., v Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1211 (2018). 
50 Mot. For Cert, Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. No. 18-8596. 
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and, as such, it might make it more difficult for Oracle to prevail 
against other companies that used Google’s code, with permission 
and encouragement from Google, but many of them may simply not 
have the financial wherewithal to fight the case in court and may 
choose to settle with Oracle or, worse, cease to operate. 
This scenario demonstrates the limitation of fair use as a 
personal privilege that applies to the particular defendant, as 
opposed to the work. Had fair use attached to the protected work, 
i.e., the copyrighted expression, be it code, lyrics, audiovisual 
content or other forms of art, it would shield all subsequent creators 
who use the content. The work at issue in Oracle v. Google was an 
open source operating system that was purposefully designed and 
distributed to be used by multiple individuals and companies.51 
Such works expose the limited ability of fair use to ensure broad 
use privileges. However, even in cases involving other 
copyrightable subject matter, the same problem arises. 
To see this, consider the case of Campbell v. Acuff Rose, in 
which the Supreme Court ruled that 2 Live Crew’s version of Roy 
Orbison’s “Oh Pretty Woman” constituted a parody of the original 
and thus qualified as a fair use.52 The Supreme Court’s ruling 
allowed 2 Live Crew to continue to perform the song and distribute 
it. If, however, a subsequent creator wanted to use 2 Live Crew’s 
song in a movie or a video game, she would not be able to do so 
even though she obtained permission from 2 Live Crew without 
also obtaining rights to the Roy Orbison song. Subsequent uses are 
not directly affected by fair use finding. 
As another example, consider Alice Randall’s “The Wind Done 
Gone,” a literary adaptation of Margaret Mitchell’s “Gone with the 
Wind” that presented the story from the vantage point of the 
African-American characters.53 After a prolonged legal battle, the 
Eleventh Circuit ruled that Alice Randall’s book was a parody of 
the “Gone with the Wind” and hence constituted fair use.54 The 
decision enabled Alice Randall’s publisher to continue with the 
distribution of the book. However, if she were to try to sell her 
movie right to a studio, the fair use ruling would not carry over. 
Similarly, if an independent theater wished to produce a play based 
on the book, it would be risking an infringement suit. The fair use 
ruling pertains to Alice’s Randall’s use alone. It does not protect 
Randall’s book in any other context. 
 
51 Oracle America Inc., v Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1186-87 (2018). 
52 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
53 Suntrust Bank v Houghton Mifflin Co. 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (2001). 
54 Id. at 1277. 
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B. The Costs of Fair Use in Its Current Form 
Under the current regime, users who desire to use content that 
fairly incorporates preexisting copyright materials have two 
options: they can either obtain licenses from all the rightsholders 
involved, past and present, or use the content without permission, 
risk a lawsuit and put their faith in the fair use defense. The first 
option raises the twin specters of high transaction costs and strategic 
behavior. This is especially true when multiple parties hold 
copyrights in the content as in the case of documentary films.55 The 
second option implies litigation costs and uncertainty about the 
legal outcome. The fair use defense has many virtues.56 Alas, 
certainty is not one of them.57 If the fair use defense fails in court, 
the defendant who raised it may not only lose her right to use the 
material, but may also be ordered to pay statutory damages to the 
plaintiff, far in excess of the value she derived from the use. The 
higher costs associated with the use of works that fairly incorporate 
preexisting copyrighted materials significantly impairs their 
marketability. We elaborate on this problem below. 
1. Licenses 
Users who wish to use (copy, display, perform, etc.) a 
copyrighted work can secure a license to do so from the relevant 
rightsholders. In fact, this is the point and purpose of establishing 
copyright protection in the first place.58 Copyright law does not 
reward authors and creators with cash payments upon creation of a 
new work. Rather, the law grants them a bundle of exclusive 
 
55 See generally Peter Jaszi, Copyright, Fair Use and Motion Pictures, 2007 
UTAH L. REV. 616. 
56 Peter A. Jaszi, Michael W. Carroll, Sean Flynn, Mike Palmedo, and Kimberlee 
Gai Weatherall, and Ariel Katz, Evaluating the Benefits of Fair Use: A Response 
to the PWC Report on the Costs and Benefits of 'Fair Use' (April 15, 2016). 
Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2773646 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.277
3646  
57 See e.g. See Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
395, 415 (2009) (noting that fair use fails to give sufficient guidance to users); 
Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, supra note 1 (discussing fair use’s lack of clarity). 
58 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, 
Information, and Law, 76 NYU L. REV.  23, 59–60 (2001) (“The Supreme Court 
has held consistently and unanimously that American law explicitly treats 
intellectual property rights in utilitarian terms.”); William M. Landes and Richard 
A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD..325, 326 
(1989) (emphasizing that one of copyright law’s central goals is to maintain 
incentives for individuals to produce creative works); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante 
versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 
(2004) (same).  
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rights.59 The expectation is that authors will earn their rewards from 
users who pay for licenses to perform one or more of the rights that 
would otherwise be exclusive to the author.60 Users, in other words, 
pay to use the content and it is the payment that is the point of 
making the rights exclusive in the first place. 
This dynamic applies no less to works that incorporate pre-
existing materials Works incorporating pre-existing copyrighted 
materials are ubiquitous. Films are often adaptations of copyrighted 
written work. News broadcasts incorporate film clips created by 
various authors. Computer programs often include previously 
copyrighted graphics or code. A movie house that wants to perform 
the film for the public must obtain a license not only from the studio 
that owns rights to the film; it must also obtain rights from the 
owners of copyright in the previously copyrighted written work on 
which the film was based. This means that the more pre-existing 
copyrighted works are incorporated into a new work, the greater the 
number of licenses that must be obtained to use the new work.61 
As is the case with any system that relies on market 
transactions, purchasing licenses inevitably involves transactions 
costs. Transaction costs typically include the cost of identifying the 
relevant rightholder, negotiating with her, formalizing a legal 
agreement and enforcing it. Typically, the higher the number of 
rightsholders whose consent needs to be obtained, the higher the 
transaction costs. In the simplest case of a new work utilizing an 
older work, users would have to secure a license from at least two 
rightholders: the copyright owner in the original work and the 
copyright owner in the follow-on work who fairly employed 
expressive content from the original work. For example, a fan 
wishing to start a “Grateful Dead” webpage and include in it photos 
of poster art from the book “Grateful Dead: The Illustrated Trip,” 
would be thwarted from doing so even though the use of the photos 
in the original book was ruled fair.62 The fact that a court ruled that 
Dorling Kinderseley’s use of the photographic content was fair does 
 
59 Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Reinventing Copyright and Patent 
Law, 113 MICH. L. REV. 231, 241 (2014) (explaining that copyright law 
incentivizes the creation of original expressive works by conferring a bundle of 
exclusive rights on authors). 
60 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine 
That? 12 J. THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW, 29, 31 (2001) (“An exclusive right 
to license or vend the work for a limited time period permits markets for public 
goods to form.”). 
61 The law and economics literature points to a positive correlation between the 
number of rightholders and the level of transaction costs. See THOMAS J. MICELI, 
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 216–17 (2004); Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and 
Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 356 (1991). 
62 See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 615 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (concluding that the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s “copyrighted 
images in its book Illustrated Trip is fair use”). 
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not carry over to other users. 
It is easy to see how the attempt to secure permission from all 
necessary rightsholders might run aground due to high transaction 
costs. For instance, a filmmaker who plans to negotiate with all the 
relevant rightsholders would need to expend substantial resources 
in the process. Just the task of identifying all the rightsholders may 
prove to requires resources in excess of the expected revenues from 
the movie. It is therefore not surprising that documentary 
filmmakers often do not even try to negotiate with all the relevant 
rightsholders and rely on fair use instead. But even in cases where 
the relevant rightsholders are readily identifiable, a user still needs 
to negotiate the terms of the use with them and formalize an 
agreement to this effect. In some case, enforcement costs are also 
likely to arise. The expenditures a user incurs in the process—
namely, the transaction costs—go to waste; they do not benefit the 
copyright owner or the user. In some cases, the benefit a user 
derives from the use of a work would justify incurring the 
transaction costs, as well as paying the copyright owner her asking 
price.63 
Our discussion so far ignored a different problem that is likely 
to arise in negotiations with multiple rightsholders: strategic 
holdouts. When a party must secure permissions from multiple 
rightsholders, each of whom holds a veto power over the enterprise 
as a whole,64 there is no reason for any of the veto holders to sell 
easily. Each rightsholder knows that that the revenue for the entire 
project depends on her consent. Each rightsholder therefore should 
demand the maximum share of the revenue she can get without 
bringing the project to a halt, up to the full value of project. The 
price each rightsholder demands is therefore strategic—it depends 
not only on the value of the rights to the rightsholder; it depends, 
more importantly on an evaluation of the prices other rightsholders 
will demand and receive. None of the rightsholders has any reason 
to moderate her demands excessively. Unfortunately, this creates aa 
real chance that the negotiations will fail. The negotiations are often 
undertaken in situations of imperfect information and 
miscalculations. Each of the rightsholders is trying to outwit the 
other rightholders in order to end up with the highest achievable 
 
63 It is precisely for this reason that Wendy Gordon listed prohibitive transaction 
costs as the first prerequisite for recognizing fair use by her lights, see Gordon, 
Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 1. 
64 See generally, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 62 (5th ed. 
1998) (justifying eminent domain as a mechanism for overcoming holdouts); 
STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 124 (2004) 
(same); Daniel B. Kelly, Acquiring Land Through Eminent Domain: 
Justifications, Limitations, and Alternatives, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 343, 345–50 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith 
eds., 2011) (same). 
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share. One rightsholder may end up demanding too much and the 
entire project can fail as a result. 
2. Fair Use 
Failed negotiations are not necessarily the end of the line for 
follow-on works. The author attempting to create a new work 
incorporating old works may decide that the licensing efforts are 
not worth it, or the author may try to obtain the relevant licenses 
and fail, but the author may still proceed on the basis of the fair use 
doctrine. Stated bluntly, the author may gamble that the use of the 
older works without a license will be found a “fair use” by courts, 
obviating the need to obtain a license. Indeed, the author may decide 
to initiate this gamble even if transaction costs are not prohibitive, 
in order to try to obtain the rights for free. 
Alas, fair use is not a straightforward gamble. The problem 
with fair use is that it is a very vague doctrine. Indeed, it is so vague 
that Larry Lessig famously defined fair use as “the right to hire a 
lawyer.”65 Judge Pierre Leval openly posited that fair use is vague 
by design and admitted that even judges do not have a shared 
understanding of what fair use is.66 Other scholars have argued that 
the vagueness of the fair use test is a welcome and necessary feature 
of the doctrine.67 
The ambiguity of fair use imposes a real cost on users.68 Users 
who rely on the fair use defense cannot know for certain how their 
defense will be treated by the court. As is true of other open-ended 
standards that rely on a balancing test, fair use inevitably leads to 
over-deterrence and underuse of works.69 To see why it is necessary 
 
65 Stephen Manes, Let’s Have Less of Lessig, Forbes (April 2, 2004) (“Fair use is 
the right to hire a lawyer.”) available at 
https://www.forbes.com/2004/04/02/cz_sm_0402manes.html#15b3269b3663 
<last visited August 15, 2009> 
66 See generally Leval, supra note 1 (stating that “[j]udges do not share a 
consensus on the meaning of fair use.”). 
67 Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 140 
(1999) (“[F]air use appears to be employed in situations of high transaction costs, 
where a muddy entitlement may be appropriate.... The ‘muddy’ four-part 
balancing standard of fair use allows courts to reallocate what the market 
cannot.”) 
68 Gideon Parchomovsky and Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 1483, 1486 (2007) (“The Supreme Court’s decision to favor ex post fairness 
over ex ante certainty comes at a steep cost for potential users of copyrighted 
works.”). 
69 See, e.g., John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on 
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 995 (1984) (noting that 
when the “probability [of liability] declines as defendants take more care, then 
defendants may tend to overcomply”); Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, 
Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 280 (1986) 
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to understand the impact of vagueness on users. Since users cannot 
know in advance whether their use is fair, many of them will refrain 
from using copyrighted works. This is because the consequences of 
erring are very harsh. A user who believes she has a colorable fair 
use claim, but is proven mistaken in court, exposes herself to the 
risk of having to pay the plaintiff large amounts of money for a use 
that may not have been worth much to her. It should be born in mind 
that the copyright act entitles successful plaintiffs to the defendant’s 
profits70 from the infringement and to statutory damages of up to 
$150,000 per willful infringement.71 Hence, users who have blind 
faith in fair use take a high stakes gamble.72 The safer bet may be 
to obtain a relatively low-cost insurance policy in the form of an 
unnecessary license. 
In an influential article, James Gibson pointed out that the 
vague nature of fair use leads to “right accretion” by copyright 
holders. Since many users are understandably reluctant to take a 
chance on the fair use doctrine, many of them prefer to obtain 
licenses from copyright holders even for potentially fair uses. This 
dynamic invariably leads to an expansion of the rights of copyright 
owners and a contraction of the domain of fair use. Over time, as 
this process repeats itself with respect to more and more uses that 
could be ruled fair, copyright owners gain more control over the use 
of their work.73 
Of course, users also have the option of not using the work at 
all. Per our earlier discussion, they would resort to this option when 
transaction costs are high or when they expect strategic holdouts to 
arise and block the path to a successful transaction. Indeed, all 
courses of action that are open to users are costly. As we explained, 
these additional costs undermine the marketability of the works 
involved. These additional costs could have been saved if 
 
(same); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic 
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 873 (1998) (observing that “if injurers are 
made to pay more than for the harm they cause, wasteful precautions may be 
taken . . . and risky but socially beneficial activities may be undesirably 
curtailed”). 
70 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (2000) (stating that a copyright infringer is liable for any 
of “the copyright owner’s actual damages and any additional profits of the 
infringer”). 
71 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). 
72 See, e.g., UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, No. 00-CIV-472(JSR), 2000 WL 
1262568, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000) (finding MP3.com liable for 
approximately $118 million in statutory damages); see also J. Cam Barker, Note, 
Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing: The 
Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright 
Infringement, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 525, 545–49 (2004) (pointing out the punitive 
nature of statutory damages in copyright law). 
73 See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property 
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 887–95 (2007). 
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subsequent users were sheltered by the original fair use finding 
received by the first user. 
II. PROPERTY LAW AND THE PROBLEMS OF FAIR USE 
Our proposal to reform fair use law draws its inspiration from 
the world of property. In order to explain our proposal, we restate 
in property terms our observations in Part I, supra, about the flaws 
of fair use. The two central flaws of extant fair use law can be 
described in property terms as follows. First, extant fair use doctrine 
recognizes personal use rights rather than rights in rem. Second, and 
relatedly, the fair use rights recognized by law are not marketable. 
Each of these flaws is analogous to problems that potentially appear 
in many property contexts, and each of these flaws has typical 
associated property solutions. In this Part, we explain how property 
law provides analogous solutions to each of these flaws. 
A. Use Rights 
Let us begin with the first of the two flaws. As we noted, fair 
use doctrine recognizes the right of a particular user to a particular 
use of a particular work.74 2 Live Crew’s fair use right to parts of 
Roy Orbison’s “Oh Pretty Woman” in its own “Pretty Woman” 
song is limited personally to 2 Live Crew; the band’s victory in its 
own fair use case does not ensure that a different band parodying 
Orbison’s song would win. Likewise, 2 Live Crew’s victory is 
limited to a particular use of a particular work; we could no longer 
be certain that it was a fair use if 2 Live Crew used Orbison’s song 
in a different work (say, “Prettier Man”) or used more of Orbison’s 
song in the same work. 
It may seem obvious that any fair use that is limited to a 
particular use of a particular work must necessarily be personal and 
limited to a particular user. However, the law of property teaches 
otherwise. 
While we tend to think of property as centered on objects or 
things,75 property law often deals with use rights. The law of 
servitudes—easements, covenants, equitable servitudes, profits a 
 
74 Infra Part I. 
75 See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 1-2 (2000) 
(noting that most people think of property as “things”); Henry E. Smith, Property 
as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012); Yun-chien Chang & 
Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil versus Common Law Property, 
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2012); Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a 
Thing or a Bundle?, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 617 (2009); THOMAS W. MERRILL & 
HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (3d ed. 2017). See 
generally, Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 531 (2005). 
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prendre, and others—gives rightholders legal authority to use 
realty76 even though another person owns the land. Consider a 
standard right-of-way easement between Blackacre owned by Alice 
and Greyacre owned by Beatrice. The most convenient route for 
Alice to drive to Blackacre is over a strip of Greyacre. Property law 
allows Alice to secure a right to drive over Greyacre without 
purchasing title to the necessary strip of land.77 Instead, Alice can 
purchase an easement—a use right—that leaves title to the strip of 
land in the hands of Beatrice, but gives Alice a right to drive to and 
from her garage over that strip of land that is recognized and 
protected by the law of property. Easements, by their nature, attach 
to the land.78 The burdened land (known as the servient tenement in 
property law) — Greyacre in our example — is subject to the 
easement even if there is a change in ownership.79 Accordingly, if 
Beatrice transfers Greyacre to Claire, Alice will not need to 
repurchase the easement from Claire. Rather, the easement is 
embedded in Claire’s title; she acquired title to the land subject to 
the easement.80 Typically, easements are appurtenant,81 meaning 
they attach to the land on the benefited side as well (in property 
terminology, the benefited land is known as the dominant 
tenement). Thus, if the benefited parcel — Blackacre in our 
example — is transferred by Alice to Danielle, Danielle would 
benefit from the easement as it is part of the title to Blackacre.82 
 
76 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 75, at 982-989. Easements can also be negative. 
A negative easement entitles the holder to prevent a certain use of the parcel to 
which the easement applies. Traditionally, the common law recognized only four 
negative easements: (1) blocking windows, (2) interfering with air flow in a 
defined channel, (3) removing artificial support for buildings, and (4) interfering 
with the flow of water in an artificial channel. See JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. 
KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & MICHAEL SCHILL, PROPERTY 736-738 (6th ed. 
2006). 
77 7 JOHN H. PEARSON, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 60.02 (2019) (“an 
easement is one of several ways in which one may obtain rights in the land of 
another, for the benefit of one’s own property or for one’s own personal 
benefit.”). 
78 Jeffrey E. Stake, Toward an Economic Understanding of Touch and Concern, 
1988 DUKE L.J. 925; Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: 
Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261 (1982). 
79 PEARSON, supra note 77, at §60.07(a) (“the very nature of an easement, and a 
major point justifying its existence, is to guarantee that an arrangement for the 
non-possessory use of land survives the transfer of that land into the hands of 
another.”). 
80 Id. 
81 Indeed, English law originally refused to recognize the validity of easements 
in gross. French, supra note 78. 
82 Property law also recognizes easements in gross. Unlike appurtenant 
easements, easements in gross do not attach to the land and do not run with the 
title to it. Rather, they are personal in nature and benefit particular individuals. In 
our previous example, Beatrice could have made the easement personal to Alice, 
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Easements are flexible tools. For instance, they can be 
constructed with time limits; Alice and Beatrice might agree, for 
example, to give the easement a five-year life. At the same time, 
many features of easements are dictated by property law, and cannot 
be modified by the parties. For instance, an easement is the 
necessary result of the transfer of a non-possessory right in real 
property properly attested to by deed, even if the parties did not 
know they were creating an easement. Thus, in the case of Baseball 
Publishing Co. v. Bruton,83 the court determined that an agreement 
giving Baseball Publishing a five-year right to place an advertising 
billboard on the side of Bruton’s building was an easement even 
though the agreement described the right as a “lease” and Bruton 
claimed the right was merely a “license.” According to the court, a 
property right becomes an easement according to its features (in this 
case, a written agreement to create non-possessory, exclusive use 
right in real property), without regard to the terminology preferred 
by the parties. 
Property law even accommodates the possible right to prevent 
a certain use of land. A negative easement, for instance, gives the 
easement holder the right to prevent the owner of land from 
undertaking certain acts.84 A conservation easement (a popular type 
of negative easement) gives the easement holder the right to block 
high impact development of the burdened land.85 Other negative 
easements may prevent owners of the burdened land from building 
in such a manner as to block a view, or to remove a support wall.86 
Property law accommodates other use rights as well. Where 
easements cannot be stretched to cover a particular non-use right, 
property law permits the use of covenants or equitable servitudes.87 
Covenants and equitable servitudes are commitments to perform or 
not to perform actions that “touch and concern” land that are 
 
rendering it an easement in gross. In such a case, the easement would continue to 
benefit Alice even if she sold her title to Blackacre and moved elsewhere, but it 
would not automatically benefit Danielle who purchased title to Blackacre from 
Alice. In the past, easements in gross were considered non-transferrable. This is 
no longer the case. Under modern property law, even easements in gross are 
transferable. See DUKEMINIER ET AL, supra note 76. 
83 302 Mass. 54, 18 N.E.2d 362 (1938). 
84 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 75, at 988-989. 
85 See generally, PEARSON, supra note 77, at § 60.02(e)(4); Jeffrey A. Blackie, 
Conservation Easements and the Doctrine of Changed Conditions, 40 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1187 (1989). 
86 See generally, PEARSON, supra note 77; J.B. Ruhl, the Background Principles 
of Natural Capital and Ecosystems Services- Did Lucas open Pandora’s Box 22 
J. LAND USE & ENV. L. 525, 534 (2007) (noting that the four types of traditionally 
recognized easements were: (1) blocking windows, (2) interfering with air flow 
in a defined channel, (3) removing artificial support for buildings, and (4) 
interfering with the flow of water in an artificial channel). 
87 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 75. 
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anchored in property law rather than contract law.88 Where the 
covenant or equitable servitude is successfully created, successors 
to title in the land are bound by the commitments of their 
predecessors. For instance, in the famous case of Tulk v. Moxhay,89 
Moxhay became the owner of Leicester Square garden, which had 
once been owned by Tulk. Tulk had sold the garden to Elms, a 
predecessor of Moxhay in title, in 1808, and Elms promised to 
maintain the premises as a garden and never to build in the garden. 
The court held that Moxhay could be held to Elms’ promise because 
the promise was one that ran with the land to successors in title,90 
under a doctrine that came to be known equitable servitude.91 
Use rights are an indispensable form of property rights in 
condominiums and other common interest communities.92 Fellow 
owners in the common interest community need to know that their 
neighbors will continue paying for the upkeep of common areas, for 
example, and that they will respect parking arrangements. A buyer 
of a condominium unit, therefore, does not merely buy title to land. 
She also subjects herself to a complex set of property arrangements 
concerning use that are anchored in a document called the 
Declaration or the “CCR” (Declaration of Covenants, Conditions 
and Restrictions). The use rights and burdens in the Declaration are 
a crucial part of the property package owned by every owner in the 
common interest community. 93 
All these use rights in land have a common feature. They are 
recognized and enforced by property law, and attach to someone 
other than the owner of the burdened land. When Eloise owns an 
easement over Francine’s land, both Eloise and Francine own 
property rights, but only Francine has title in the burdened land. 
Francine continues to have an exclusive right of possession (subject 
to Eloise’s easement). Francine can sell her land, mortgage it, 
transmit ownership of it by will, and do all the other things an owner 
can, subject only to the caveat that her ownership and that of any 
successor in interest will continue to be subject to the use right 
 
88 See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 475 
( 3d Ed. 2000); MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 75. 
89 Tulk v Moxhay (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch.). 
90 Id. 
91 See DUKEMINIER ET AL, supra note 76, at 864. 
92 See Jonathan D. Ross- Harrington, Property Forms in Tension: Preference 
Inefficiency, Rent-Seeking, and the Problem of Notice in Modern Condominiums 
28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 192 (2009) (“Condominiums, like all common-
interest communities, are distinguished by their complex system of servitudes 
and the governance structure designed to amend and enforce the applicable 
covenants.”). 
93 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Governing Communities by 
Auction, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014) (noting that “[i]n homeowners’ and 
condominium associations, the servitudes are generally aggregated in a large 
document called the covenants, conditions, and regulations (CCR).”).  
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protected by Eloise’s easement.94 
As we will explain later in this Part, our proposal would create 
an option for judges to treat fair use rights as durable use rights in 
the way property law treats use rights. Ownership of the 
copyrighted work would continue to remain with the author or the 
successor in interest. However, the fair use too would take on the 
features of legally cognizable use right that is not merely personal. 
B. Market Overt 
We now turn to the second of the two flaws we noted in Part I: 
the lack of marketability of fair uses. As we noted, fair uses are 
restricted to the particular use by the particular user. Follow-on 
users undertaking uses identical to the fair use cannot be certain that 
they too will be found to have used the copyrighted work fairly. The 
problem can be roughly described as a lack of “marketability” of 
fair use rights. The term marketability is used in a number of 
different ways in property law; what interests us here is the ability 
to turn a personal privilege into a durable property right that can be 
transferred to others in certain circumstances. This is perhaps best 
understood by considering the property doctrines of “market overt.” 
Market overt literally means “open or public market,”95 but 
when property lawyers speak of “market overt,” they are referring 
to the set of doctrines under which a seller with defective title can 
transfer good title to a bona fide purchaser.96 There are different 
rules of market overt for chattels and realty. As we shall see, the 
market overt rules of realty are of particular interest for our 
proposal. 
One of the basic principles of property law in transfers of title 
is nemo dat quod non habet, which means one cannot transfer what 
one does not have.97 As a general rule, a buyer cannot acquire better 
title than the seller had. If Irene owns 50% of Blackacre, she cannot 
sell to Jacqueline more than 50% of Blackacre; if Irene has no 
ownership interest at all, she cannot sell anything to Jacqueline. The 
rules of market overt are an important exception to nemo dat quod 
non habet.98 Under the rules of market overt, if the buyer purchases 
 
94 See generally PEARSON, supra note 77 § 60. 
95 See J.G. Pease, Change of the Property in Goods by Sale in Market Overt, 8 
COLUM. L. REV. 375, 375 (1908) (“Market overt means a public market…”). 
96 See generally Harold R. Weinberg, Markets Overt, Voidable Titles, and 
Feckless Agents: Judges and Efficiency in the Antebellum Doctrine of Good Faith 
Purchase, 56 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1981). 
97 Edward M. Swartz, The Bona Fide Purchaser Revisited: A Comparative 
Inquiry, 42 B.U. L. REV. (1962). 
98 J. WALTER JONES, THE POSITION AND RIGHTS OF A BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR 
VALUE OF GOODS IMPROPERLY OBTAINED 38-39 (1921); Daniel E. Murray, Sale 
in Market Overt, 9 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 24 (1960).  
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a good in good faith, and fulfills other conditions, she can acquire 
good title in the object even though the seller did not own the object 
at all.99 
The term market overt is taken from a medieval English 
doctrine that provided a very broad exception to the general rule of 
nemo dat. In the medieval doctrine, anyone who purchased chattel 
in a chartered or customary marketplace in the open, in a transaction 
conducted in public, would acquire good title to the good, no matter 
what its provenance.100 Eventually, the term came to be applied to 
the whole family of doctrines giving purchasers good title contrary 
to the rule of nemo dat.101 Today, the most familiar of those 
doctrines is found in UCC, which describes in § 2-403 two distinct 
situations in which a good faith purchaser can acquire perfect title 
to an object despite buying it from a seller with defective title.102 
The two doctrines can be roughly described as sales involving 
voidable title and sales by an entrustee. 
The entrustee rule is the easier one to summarize. According to 
§ 2-403(2), ‘[a]ny entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant 
who deals in goods of that kind gives [the entrustee] power to 
transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in [the] ordinary course 
of business.”103 Section 2-403(3) goes on to define entrusting as 
including “any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of 
possession regardless of any condition expressed between the 
parties to the delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the 
procurement of the entrusting or the possessor's disposition of the 
goods have been such as to be larcenous under the criminal law.”104 
The entrusting rule can be easily illustrated. Imagine that Zena owns 
a car, and that her friend Yolanda owns a business selling used cars. 
If Zena lends her car to Yolanda for the weekend in order to drive 
to a vacation cabin, and Yolanda instead drives the car to the used 
car lot and sells it to Xuan during business hours as if the car were 
part of the used car lot inventory, Xuan will acquire good title to the 
car even though Yolanda never owned the car and was not 
 
99 See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Laws of Good Faith 
Purchase, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1332 (2011)  
100 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright and Good Faith Purchasers, 104 CAL. 
L. REV. 269, 277 (2016) (The market overt doctrine sought to protect purchasers 
who bought their goods from sellers in “open” fairs and markets, which formed 
the principal channel for trade during the time.). See also J.G. Pease, supra note 
95.  
101 Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE 
L.J. 1057, 1057 (1954) (henceforth, Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine). 
102 U.C.C. § 2-403 (amended 1988). See also, Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith 
Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant 
Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605 (1981) (henceforth, Gilmore, The Good Faith 
Purchase). 
103 U.C.C. § 2-403(2). 
104 U.C.C. § 2-403(3). 
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authorized by Zena to sell it. 
The voidable title rules are more complex. The voidable title 
rule in § 2-403(1) states that “a person with voidable title has power 
to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value.”105 
Unfortunately, the rule fails to provide its own definition of 
“voidable“ title, and it does not clarify its connection to the common 
law of voidable title. Instead, the rule goes on to say that “When 
goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the 
purchaser has such power even though (a) the transferor was 
deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or (b) the delivery was 
in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or (c) it was 
agreed that the transaction was to be a 'cash sale', or (d) the delivery 
was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the 
criminal law.”106 This may be interpreted as an elaboration of the 
traditional common law categories of voidable title, or, perhaps as 
the UCC’s own illustration of the potential types of voidable title.107 
The doctrine that good faith purchasers can acquire good title 
from sellers with defective voidable title is not limited to chattels. 
The common law also recognizes a market overt-type rule that 
grants good title to good faith purchasers of real property rights 
when they purchase those rights from a seller with voidable title.108 
If, for instance, Lena acquires a deed to Blackacre from Katherine, 
paying with bad checks, and Mary then buys Blackacre from Lena 
in good faith, Mary can establish good title to Blackacre, 
 
105 U.C.C. § 2-403(1). 
106 Id. 
107 For discussion see Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase, supra note 102 at 608-
620.. One classic type of voidable title that is clearly part of the common law and 
the UCC rule is a case where someone acquires defective title through a fraud in 
inducement such as payment by a bad check. Consider, for instance, the case of 
Kotis v. Nowlin Jewelry. Nowlin Jewelry, the original owner of a watch, sold it 
to Sitton for a check that was ultimately dishonored by the bank due to 
insufficient funds. Before Nowlin Jewelry discovered that the check was bad, 
Sitton sold the watch to Kotis. When the check was dishonored, Nowlin Jewelry 
sought to recover the watch on the grounds that Sitton had never acquired good 
title due to his fraud, and that Kotis, therefore, could not acquire good title from 
Sitton. Kotis, however, claimed that he had acquired good title to the watch 
because Sitton’s title, while defective, was “voidable,” and that Kotis therefore 
acquired good title as a good faith purchaser for value. The court decided that 
Sitton’s title was voidable, and that a good faith purchaser could therefore take 
good title. The court reasoned that Nowlin Jewelry had intended to sell the watch 
to Sitton, and was deceived only about the validity of the payment. Sitton had 
therefore committed a “fraud in the inducement,” which is a type of fraud that 
leads to the defrauding acquiror obtaining voidable title. Unfortunately for Kotis, 
the court also determined that Kotis was not a good faith purchaser, and Nowlin 
Jewelry prevailed notwithstanding Kotis’ victory on the issue of voidable title. 
Kotis v. Nowlin Jewelry, Inc., 844 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. App. 1992). 
108 See Balganesh, supra note 140 104 CAL. L. REV. at 318. See also, Amethyst 
Land Co. v. Terhune, 326 P.3d 12, 17 (N.M. 2014). 
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notwithstanding the voidability of Lena’s title. 
However, the most important exception to the ordinary rule of 
nemo dat quod non habet in real estate comes from an entirely 
different source. Recording acts for real estate transfers establish 
broad exceptions permitting purchasers to acquire valid rights to 
purchased land, even though the title of the transferor was 
lacking.109 The classic case covered by the recording acts is one 
where the owner of land sells the same land to multiple purchasers. 
A straight application of the logic of nemo dat quod non habet 
would tell us that the first purchaser would acquire good title, and 
subsequent purchasers nothing. For instance, if Celeste were to sell 
Blackacre to Darlene, and then to Elsa, the logic of the situation 
would dictate that Elsa would get nothing because when she 
“purchased” Blackacre from Celeste, Darlene already owned it and 
Celeste had nothing to sell. The Recording Acts may dictate a 
different result. Under the Recording Acts, a subsequent purchaser 
for value of real estate may establish good title by complying with 
the Recording Acts conditions.110 The conditions required of the 
subsequent purchaser can be roughly divided into three categories. 
In “race” jurisdictions, a subsequent purchaser can establish good 
title by recording the purchase before the prior purchaser. In 
“notice” jurisdictions, the subsequent purchaser can establish good 
title if she purchases in good faith without notice of the prior 
transaction (if the prior purchaser’s transaction is already recorded 
at the time of the subsequent purchase, the subsequent purchaser 
will be deemed to have “constructive notice” of the prior 
transaction). In “race-notice” jurisdictions, the subsequent 
purchaser can prevail only if she records first and she purchased 
without notice of the prior transaction (i.e., if she meets the 
conditions to win in both a race and a notice jurisdiction).111 
The title granted by the Recording Acts has some peculiar 
features. Generally, a subsequent purchaser who acquires good title 
by meeting the conditions of the Recording Acts can convey that 
good title to anyone else. To return to the earlier example, let us 
suppose that Celeste owns Blackacre, and that she sells Blackacre 
first to Darlene and then to Elsa. Let us further suppose that Darlene 
fails to record her purchase, and that Elsa has no knowledge of the 
earlier sale to Darlene, and that Elsa properly records her purchase 
in the office of the recorder of deeds. The Recording Act (whether 
of the race, notice, or race-notice variety) would grant Elsa good 
 
109 JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, MICHAEL H. 
SCHILL & LIOR JACOB STRAHILLEVITZ, PROPERTY 662 (9th ed. 2018) (“recording 
acts have the function of protecting purchasers for value and lien creditors against 
prior unrecorded interests.”).  
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 682-85 (discussing different types of Recording Acts). 
PRELIMINARY PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT, FORTHCOMING 107 VA. L. REV. (2021) 
 © 2021, Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky 2/9/2021 
Propertizing Fair Use 
28 
title, because even though Celeste lacked title to Blackacre at the 
time of the sale to Elsa, Elsa bought without notice of the prior sale, 
and she recorded her purchase first. But let us imagine that the chain 
of transactions continues. Darlene finally records her purchase, and 
then Elsa sells Blackacre to Francine. Does Francine have good 
title? The answer is yes, due to what is called the “shelter rule.” The 
shelter rule clarifies that “one who is not a bona fide purchaser, but 
who takes an interest in property from a bona fide purchaser, may 
be sheltered in the latter's protective status.”112 That is to say, a 
subsequent purchaser who acquires good title as a result of the 
Recording Act does not merely enjoy a personal privilege, but 
actually enjoys the rights of any owner with good title, including 
the right to transfer that title to others.113 
Like the rules of market overt, our proposal seeks to make fair 
use rights marketable, enabling fair use findings to “shelter” follow-
on users. As in the case of the market overt, it is not necessary for 
all subsequent uses to be sheltered by the initial fair use finding. 
However, without a fairly broad shelter rule for fair uses, fair uses 
could not rightly be described as marketable. 
III. A SECOND CONCEPTION OF FAIR USE 
In this Part, we introduce our proposal to transform fair use 
rights into marketable, durable use rights. The gist of our proposal 
is to introduce a novel conception of fair use alongside the existing 
type of fair use. Our new kind of fair use is modelled as a property 
defense that shelters all subsequent users of the work that won a fair 
use status. On our vision, this new conception would complement, 
not replace, the existing fair use defense. We also explain how 
 
112 E.g., Sun Valley Land & Minerals, Inc. v. Burt, 123 Idaho 862, 853 P.2d 607 
(1993). 
113 M.J. Higgins, The Transfer of Property Under Illegal Transactions, 25 
MODERN L. REV. 149 (1969). While the shelter rule provides wide protection for 
the good faith purchaser, that protection is not prophylactic. One standard 
exception to the shelter rule is called the “original owner exception.” It provides 
that “when a good faith purchaser obtains the property from a grantor who had 
notice of an outstanding interest in the property, the shelter rule does not apply if 
the property is reconveyed to the grantor.” Strekal v. Espe, 114 P.3d 67, 74 (Co. 
Ct. App. 2004). To illustrate this, let us return to our prior example in which 
Celeste conveys Blackacre first to Darlene and then to Elsa, and Elsa acquires 
good title due to the Recording Act. If Elsa sells Blackacre to the innocent 
Francine, Francine will enjoy the benefit of the shelter rule, and she, too, will be 
considered the owner of Blackacre with good title. If, however, Elsa sells 
Blackacre to Celeste, Celeste will not be able to take advantage of the shelter 
provided by Elsa’s recorded good faith purchase, and she will not be able to 
reacquire title from Elsa. A second exception to the shelter rule is when the 
benefiting party from the Recording Act then conveys to a new purchaser who 
“who is guilty of violating a trust or duty with respect to the property.” Id. at 74. 
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judges would choose between the two conceptions of fair use in 
individual cases. We show that our proposed addition would 
improve the workings of our copyright system. After presenting our 
proposal, we show that our proposal to reform fair use law is 
consistent with the general trend in copyright law to create rights 
for the creators of follow-on works in order to enhance works’ 
marketability. 
A. A Proposal for Reforming Fair Use Law 
Our reform proposal consists of three interlocking steps. First, 
we introduce a new conception of fair use, under which fair use 
would constitute as an in rem, property remedy. This new 
conception is not intended to supplant existing fair use doctrine, but, 
rather, to complement it. The vision we present below consists of 
two conceptions of fair use: the in personam, familiar form and a 
new in rem fair use exception. This would lead to a two-option fair 
use menu. Second, we give judges the ability, in appropriate cases, 
to shelter not only the particular defendant before them, but also all 
subsequent legitimate users of the defendant’s work. Judges could 
do this by ruling in the particular case that the fair use finding is in 
rem and marketable. Third, to ensure clarity, we propose two 
default rules that determine which of the two conceptions of fair use 
would apply if the court failed explicitly to choose between the 
competing conceptions of fair use. 
As we explained, extant fair use is an in-personam defense that 
applies on a per use basis. Our first innovation is to introduce a 
different conception of fair use that is fashioned as a property 
defense.  Under the our proposed in rem conception of fair use, fair 
use would take on the character of an easement on a copyrighted 
work. Once a certain use had been declared fair by a court, the 
classification would carry over to other users who want to make use 
of the same expression. In other words, a court’s finding of fair use 
would have the same effect as market overt rules in property: it 
would allow defendants whose use was ruled fair by a court to give 
use rights free of claims by prior authors whose content was 
incorporated into the work. Fair use, in other words, would have 
sheltering power.  
On this conception of fair use, if the Supreme Court were to 
find that Google’s use of Oracle’s APIs was fair, the benefit of the 
ruling would inure not only to Google, but also to all the developers 
of all the applications that run on Android. Since they operated with 
Google’s blessing and clearly had permission from Google to offer 
their content to Android users, they, too, would be sheltered from 
potential lawsuits from Oracle. 
It should be emphasized that this proposed property conception 
PRELIMINARY PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT, FORTHCOMING 107 VA. L. REV. (2021) 
 © 2021, Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky 2/9/2021 
Propertizing Fair Use 
30 
of fair use is not meant to replace the traditional fair use defense. 
Rather, it is designed to complement it. Hence, the introduction of 
the property version of fair use would result in a simple legal menu 
with two fair use conceptions: (a) the traditional in personam fair 
use defense that avails only the specific individual defendant and 
would cover only particular use she has made of the plaintiffs work; 
and (b) the property version of fair use that protects not only the 
concrete defendant, but all subsequent users who received 
permission from her to use the work.  
The introduction of a fair use menu would require judges to 
choose among three options in fair use cases (as opposed to the two 
familiar options they choose from today). Judges could deny fair 
use altogether, find traditional fair use or grant the property version 
of fair use. Importantly, the criteria for making the decision would 
remain the same. We do not propose changing the traditional fair 
use test enshrined in section 107 of the Copyright Act. Hence, 
judges will not have to retrain themselves. Substantively, they 
would be asked to perform the same familiar task they have always 
performed. Only the consequences would change. The introduction 
of the property version of fair use would enable judges to redefine 
the ramifications of a fair use ruling by extending their decision to 
a much larger group of users.  
Judges would have the power to grant the expansive, property 
version of fair use, irrespective of the defendant’s pleadings. In fact, 
defendants would not be required to specify which of the two fair 
use varieties they argue. As today, they would simply argue fair use. 
The reason is simple: if defendants were forced to choose between 
the two options and their choice would bind the court, defendants 
would likely prefer to err on the side of safety and raise the 
traditional fair use defense. Hence, it should be the judge and not 
the defendant who gets to decide which of the two conceptions of 
fair use to adopt.  
Since our proposal does not affect the ability of judges to find 
traditional fair use, it should not raise any concern that it would 
adversely affect the willingness of judges to find fair use. Judges 
who were wary of ruling in favor of an in rem fair use could reject 
that option, and stick with the traditional fair use finding. Judges, in 
other words, could always take the safe and conservative approach. 
The third part of our proposal is to establish a set of default 
rules that would determine which of the two versions of fair use 
would obtain where judges fail to address this point. Where judges 
remain silent (accidently or deliberately) as to whether they adopted 
the in personam or in rem version of fair use, we propose that the 
determination be made in accordance with the following guidelines. 
In cases in which the alleged infringement consists of incorporating 
copyrighted content into a new work, as in the case of the Android 
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operating system, or the “Pretty Woman” song, the property version 
of fair use should be the legal default. This is because in such cases, 
the marketability of the putatively infringing derivative work is a 
paramount concern and a broad fair use finding would benefit all 
future users of this work.  In all other cases, the traditional, in 
personam conception of fair use would constitute the default 
setting. For example, if a college professor plays a short video to 
her students and gets sued by the copyright owner, the traditional in 
personam version of fair use should apply. Here it is important to 
grant protection to the professor on a personal, per use, basis. There 
is no need to extend protection beyond her. Marketability is not a 
paramount concern and the traditional version of fair use therefore 
suffices. 
To illustrate, consider the famous case of Sony v. Universal 
City Studios.114 In that case, Sony, the manufacturer of the Betamax 
video cassette recorder, argued that home users of the recorder 
could lawfully record over-the-air television programs in order to 
watch them later. The Supreme Court agreed, finding that such 
copying for the purpose of “time-shifting” falls within the 
boundaries of fair use.115 In large part, the Court adopted the 
analysis of the trial court, which viewed the noncommercial 
personal use of the recordings as central to the finding of fair use.116 
In cases where the finding of fair use is grounded primarily or solely 
in the fact that the work is being personally used by the user, there 
is little utility to a potential fair use easement. In such cases, even 
where the judges fail to specify what type of fair use they prefer, it 
should be obvious that the fair use ruling is in personam. 
B. Our Proposal Compared to Collateral Estoppel 
At this point, some of readers may wonder if our proposal is 
not made superfluous by the non-mutual collateral estoppel 
doctrine. As we will explain, the answer is no. The non-mutual 
collateral estoppel has branched out of its more familiar cousin, 
mutual collateral estoppel. Both doctrines deal with issue 
preclusion, a subset of res judicata.117 Their rationale for existence 
is to economize on judicial resources.118 The basic idea is “that once 
a person has been afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate a 
 
114 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
115 Id. at 455 (“home time-shifting is fair use.”). 
116 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963 (9th 
Cir. 1982). 
117 See Jarosz v. Palmer, 766 N.E.2d 482, 487 (Mass. 2002) (dividing res judicata 
law into issue preclusion and claim preclusion).  
118 See Gramatan Home Investors Corp., 386 N.E.2d at 1331 (explaining that 
issue preclusion is necessary “to conserve judicial resources by discouraging 
redundant litigation.”).  
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particular issue, that person may not be permitted to do so again.”119 
Historically, issue preclusion arose only between the same 
litigants.120 Thus, the doctrine was called mutual collateral estoppel. 
Over time, the mutuality requirement has been eroded, primarily out 
of fear of inconsistent rulings by different courts, and the non-
mutual collateral estoppel was born.  
The potential validity of non-mutual collateral estoppel was 
first recognized for defensive purposes by the California Supreme 
Court in Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings 
Ass'n.121 In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of 
Illinois Foundation,122 a patent infringement case, the U.S. Supreme 
Court gave its approval to the use of defensive non-mutual collateral 
estoppel. In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, the respondent, whose 
patent was ruled invalid in prior litigation, tried to assert the same 
patent against a different corporation. The Court ruled that 
collateral estoppel applied, even though different parties were in 
court, and the patent claim was therefore barred.123 Subsequently, 
in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,124 the Court also recognized the 
possibility of using non-mutual collateral estoppel offensively, 
granting trial courts “broad discretion to determine when it should 
be applied.”125 In addition to its place in federal law, non-mutual 
collateral estoppel doctrine has been adopted in a majority of states, 
although a sizeable minority continues to insist on mutuality.126 
The doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel has been 
criticized by commentators on both fairness and efficiency 
grounds.127 Without wading into this debate, our aim is to explain 
why the doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel falls short of the 
in rem fair use conception we propose in this Article. Most 
importantly, unlike validity determinations, whose applicability is 
universal (a copyright or a patent is either valid or not), fair use 
determinations are invariably context specific. For this reason, non-
mutual collateral estoppel will rarely, if ever, come into play in fair 
use cases. Differences in party identity and even minor differences 
 
119 Id.  
120 See e.g., Lewis A. Grossman, The Story of Parklane: The “Litigation Crisis” 
and the Efficiency Imperative, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 387, 390-91 (Kevin 
M. Clermont ed., 2004). 
121 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942). 
122 402 U.S. 313 (1971). 
123 Id. at 347. See also, Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Intellectual Property 
Defenses, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1483, (2013) (classifying patent invalidation as a 
general, in rem, defense).  
124 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
125 Id. at 331.  
126 Steven P. Nonkes, Reducing the Unfair Effects of Nonmutual Issue Preclusion 
through Damages Limits, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1459, 1468 (2009). 
127  For review, see id. at1469-74. 
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in use assure that it is nearly impossible for a fair use issue to arise 
in precisely the same manner in proceedings between other parties, 
even over the same work or set of works. 
Our in rem fair use conception, by contrast, is tailored to 
provide substantive, as opposed to procedural, shelter. It does not  
require downstream users to show that their use is exactly the same 
as that of a previous fair user; and it is unlikely that the uses will 
ever be precisely identical. The easement analogy is illuminating 
here, too. An in rem fair use ruling, similar to an easement, runs 
with the asset to all future users. A court that decides to award an in 
rem fair use is presumed to have taken into account the possibility 
that follow-on users might use the content in different ways and to 
have approved of this option. As we emphasize throughout this 
Article, the in rem conception is not applicable to all cases and 
where it is inapplicable, a court can find a standard, in personam, 
fair use, or deny fair use altogether. But once it adopts the 
conception we propose, all future users of the specific content will 
be sheltered.  
Finally, we should note that our proposal obviates the need to 
litigate. An in rem fair use ruling would avail all future users, giving 
them peace of mind and a true sense of security. A non-mutual 
collateral estoppel cannot achieve this. It should be borne in mind 
that the cost of litigation and the fear of the uncertainty that 
accompanies it often combine to stifle individual creativity and 
limit the use of existing copyrighted content.  
C. The Advantages of Our Proposal 
Our proposal offers three potential advantages relative to the 
current one conception regime of fair use. First, the introduction of 
that in rem, property version of fair use would increase certainty 
with respect to the use of derivative works that fairly incorporate 
preexisting copyrighted content. As we explained, the adoption of 
our proposal would allow judges in appropriate fair use cases to 
shelter other potential users by allowing them to engage in the same 
use that was ruled fair. At the same time, our approach would permit 
tailoring remedies to the specific circumstances of fair use cases. 
Currently, all fair use cases are treated in the same manner. Extant 
doctrine allows judges to take account of societal concerns, but at 
the end of the day the ruling affects only the defendant. The 
proposed property version of fair use would allow judges to take 
account of the potential for future uses of the fair use work, without 
being constrained to a single conception. Under our proposal, 
judges would have the ability to consider the implication of fair use 
claims for other users and fashion their rulings accordingly. 
Moreover, the default settings of fair use we proposed would ensure 
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clarify about the particular meaning of fair use rulings in those cases 
where the judge chose not to specify which version to apply.  
Second, our proposal would have the salutary effect of 
lowering transaction and litigation costs for follow on creators.128 
Current fair use doctrine forces creators of expressive works that 
rely on prior derivative works to obtain licenses from both the 
original owner and the fair user, or plead their own fair use case 
anew in court. Both options are costly. To a large degree, our 
proposal alleviates this burden. In cases in which judges would find 
a property fair use, the ruling would economize on transaction costs 
for follow-on users and conserve judicial resources for courts. This 
is because, unlike existing fair use rulings, in rem fair uses would 
clear the path for all subsequent users of the work involved in the 
litigation.  
To illustrate, imagine that the Supreme Court were to issue a 
property fair use ruling in favor of Google. Such a ruling would put 
out of harm’s way not only all the companies that created Android 
enabled applications, but also all future companies that produce 
such applications. This, in turn, would free up considerable 
resources for the relevant parties. 
Third, and finally, our proposal would enhance the use of 
copyrighted content. The sheltering principle would enable multiple 
downstream users to create adaptations of derivative works that 
were found by courts to make fair uses of older works. Any finding 
by a court of an in rem fair use would permit downstream users to 
utilize the fairly used content without worrying about being exposed 
to legal liability for incorporating it into a new work. The addition 
of the property conception of fair use will open up new creative 
avenues for follow-on creators and users and, in the aggregate, 
increase the liberties the public at large would have with respect to 
copyrighted content. Needless to say, these options would arise 
when a court deems them appropriate. As should be clear, the 
availability of the broad fair use conception is born out of judicial 
determination or implicit judicial approval in appropriate cases. In 
all other cases, the familiar view of fair use would apply.  
IV. EXTANT COPYRIGHT LAW AND MARKETABILITY 
Having proposed our suggested reform of fair use law, we now 
turn to showing how it is consistent with the general trend in 
copyright law. 
As we have noted,129 fair uses often involve the creation of a 
follow-on work to an already copyrighted original work. Even when 
 
128 For discussion, see infra, Part I.B. 
129 Supra Part I. 
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the use is fair, and the creation of the follow-on work lawful, 
copyright ownership in the original persists undisturbed, including 
in those pieces of the original incorporated in the follow-on work. 
In the absence of a mechanism like our proposal, this doctrinal 
feature of copyright sets up future clashes between the rights of the 
creator of the follow-on work (the fair user) and the rights of the 
owner of the original work. Every use of the follow-on work (such 
as a public performance) necessarily involves a use of the original 
work, and thus, absent our proposal, the follow-on work can never 
be used without a license from the owner of the original work. 
Fair uses are not the only instances in which copyright law has 
had to cope with the fallout of the lawful creation of a follow-on 
work that incorporates parts of an original work owned by someone 
else. Indeed, the world of copyright is replete with instances of 
follow-on works being created lawfully with permission from the 
owner at the time, only to have ownership of the original work 
reassigned to someone else who no longer permits use of the 
derivative work. Fortunately, as we shall see, copyright law has 
created a number of compromise solutions where owners of an 
original deny permission to the owner of an already existing follow-
on work. These solutions ensure some measure of durability and 
marketability of rights in a follow-on work after the reassignment 
of ownership. These compromise solutions share many features 
with our proposed reform of fair use law.130 
Copyright’s termination rights, for instance, give former 
owners of copyrights the ability, in some cases, to terminate a prior 
transfer of ownership, and thereby to recover ownership of a 
copyright after many years in which the rights had belonged to the 
transferee.131 In some cases, the former transferee/owner had 
properly authorized the creation of a derivative work, but the post-
termination owner (the original owner) no longer wishes to license 
the use of the derivative work. Without some arrangement to ensure 
the durability and marketability of rights in the now-problematic 
derivative work, use of the derivative work will depend on the 
decision of the original owner. That original owner could veto all 
uses of the derivative work and essentially render it worthless. 
Fortunately, the law of copyright termination provides for the 
continued exploitation of derivative works following 
termination.132 
In the remainder this Part, we examine the law of termination 
 
130 For a different proposed approach to follow-on works, as part of a 
comprehensive approach to copyright improvements, see Mark A. Lemley, The 
Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 
(1997). 
131 See infra, Part III.D. 
132 Id. 
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rights and other situations in which copyright law has confronted 
potential clashes between the rights of owners of a copyright in a 
work and the rights of the owner of a follow-on work. We show 
that, in such situations, Congress and the courts have employed 
doctrinal mechanisms similar to our proposed version of fair use to 
preserve and enhance the marketability of expressive content and 
prevent copyright holders from blocking the use of works that rely 
on preexisting content. Specifically, in the remainder of this Part, 
we discuss three instances that illustrate this dynamic: renewals of 
copyrights, termination of copyrights and restoration of copyright 
protection. In each case, we illustrate the potential problem of 
durability and marketability and look at the solution already 
incorporated in copyright law. 
A. Renewals 
Our first example concerns renewal rights. 
Since the inception of legal copyright protection,133 copyrights 
have been limited in time; no one owns a perpetual copyright in a 
work of authorship. Today, in most cases, copyrights persist for 70 
years after the death of the author.134 This unitary term of protection 
is an innovation of the 1976 Copyright Act.135 Historically, the 
copyright protection term was not unitary. Authors would receive 
an initial term of protection (14 years under the earliest copyright 
statutes,136 but 28 years under the 1909 Copyright Act137), and a 
right to renew that protection for a second “renewal term” of equal 
length (another 28 years under the 1909 Act).138 While the first 
protection period was granted to authors automatically, the second 
term was not; authors had to obtain it by following the procedure 
for renewing their rights.139 When the 1976 Copyright Act 
introduced unitary terms, it did not retroactively unify the terms of 
all copyrights then in existence. Unitary terms applied under the 
1976 Act prospectively only; copyrights created on or after the act’s 
effective date of January 1, 1978 enjoyed a unitary term.140 
Copyrights created earlier than that continued to have bifurcated 
 
133 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., C. 19 (Eng.). 
134 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302 (a). 
135 Avishalom Tor & Dotan Oliar, Incentives to Create Under a Lifetime-Plus-
Years Copyright Duration: Lessons from a Behavioral Economic Analysis for 
Eldered v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. Rev. 437 (2002) (discussing the incentive 
effects of the move to a single fixed term in the 1976 copyright act).  
136 For discussion, see Tor & Oliar, id. at 450 n. 39 (surveying the history of 
copyright protection terms under various copyright acts). 
137 Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §9.01 (reviewing the history of the copyright 
terms). 
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terms—an original term for 28 years, and a longer renewal term (the 
1976 Act extended the renewal term to 47 years, and later 
legislation extended it again to 67 years).141 This meant that, even 
after passage of the 1976 Act, owners would have to file their 
renewal papers on time, and in the proper format, in order to enjoy 
the full potential term of protection for works created in the decades 
before the effective date of the 1976 Act. In 1992, Congress relaxed 
this burden by making renewal automatic.142 This meant that works 
created and published with notice between the years of 1964 and 
1977 would get the full 75 (and later 95) years of protection, but 
that protection would be divided between a 28 year original term, 
and an automatically received 47 (later 67) year renewal term.143 
From the outset, courts viewed ownership of the renewal right 
as separate from ownership of the copyright in the initial term of 
protection.144 This was not a far-fetched interpretation. Section 23 
of the 1909 Act, for example, specified that "the copyright secured 
by this Act shall endure for twenty-eight years from the date of first 
publication" before separately establishing that "the author of [a 
copyrighted] work, if still living, or [the successor designated by 
law] shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in 
such work for a further term of twenty-eight years when application 
for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the 
copyright office and duly registered therein within one year prior to 
the expiration of the original term of copyright."145 Similar 
treatment could be found in earlier copyright acts.146 
The bifurcation of copyright into two separate sets of rights—
one associated with the initial term, and the second associated with 
the potential renewal term—could be decisive in copyright disputes. 
If, for instance, Jane Doe wrote a short story, and then sold rights in 
the story to BigBook Publishing House, courts would view Bigbook 
as the owner of the first 28-year term of copyright protection in the 
short story, but not necessarily as the owner of the renewal right. 
Unless there were some reason to read the license otherwise, it 
would be Doe who would own the renewal right. If Doe properly 
filed renewal forms in the 28th year of copyright protection, the 
short story would then enjoy an additional 28 years of copyright 
 
141 Id. 
142 Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264 (1992). 
143 Supra note 140. 
144 See e.g. G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 
1951) (holding the renewal right “creates a new estate, and the few cases which 
have dealt with the subject assert that the new estate is clear of all rights, interests 
or licenses granted under the original copyright”). 
145 Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). 
146 See Seymour M. Bricker, Renewal and Extension of Copyright 29 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 23, 24 (outlining the history of copyright renewal and ownership rights in 
the common law). 
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protection, and Doe would be the owner of the copyright during that 
renewal term. 
In the landmark 1943 case of Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. 
Witmark & Sons, the Supreme Court determined that authors could 
transfer renewal terms before they were secured.147 Thus, a single 
transfer of rights could cover both the initial term and the renewal 
period.148 In our example, Jane Doe could sell to BigBook 
Publishing House her renewal term together with the original term 
of copyright protection if she so desired. However, courts placed 
some limits on the transfer of renewal terms. The courts noted that 
the statute did not unambiguously give renewal terms to the 
author;149 the 1909 statute granted the renewal term to the author “if 
still living, or the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the 
author be not living, or if such author, widow, widower, or children 
be not living, then the author's executors, or in the absence of a will, 
his next of kin.”150 Courts determined that if the author died before 
securing the renewal term, the attempted transfer of the renewal 
term would be ineffective, because the author never had any rights 
to give; instead, the rights to the renewal term would pass to the 
statutory designees who would be free to ignore the transfer.151 
This judicial scheme provided the background for the dilemma 
addressed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Rohauer v. 
Killiam Shows, Inc.152 The 1977 case concerned the Rudolf 
Valentino film The Son of the Sheik, which had been based on an 
earlier novel The Sons of the Sheik.153 The novel had been written 
by Edith Maude Hull, who had sold the motion picture rights to 
Joseph Moskowitz.154 On the basis of that sale, a film was made, 
and the film copyright was subsequently sold several times, ending 
up in the hands of Killiam Shows.155 Unfortunately, Hull (the author 
of the novel) died too early to renew her copyright, and the renewal 
right ended up with her daughter Cecil Winstanley Hull, who ended 
up selling all rights in the novel to Rohauer.156 Thus, Rohauer ended 
up with the copyright in the novel during the renewal period, while 
 
147 Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 659 (1943). 
148 Id. 
149 See e.g. De Sylva v Ballentine 351 U.S. 570, 573 (1956) (“the statute is hardly 
unambiguous, however, and present problems of interpretation not solved by 
literal application of the words as they are ‘normally’ used.”). 
150 Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 23 (1970). 
151 For discussion, see Jeffrey M. Lowy, When Does the Renewal Term Vest: 
Before and After the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, 13 LOY. L.A. L. ENT. L. 
REV. 437 (1993). 
152 Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc. 551 F.2d 484. 
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Killiam Shows owned the copyright in the film. Rohauer sought to 
block a television broadcast of the film. There was no question that 
the film had been lawfully made, and that Killiam Shows lawfully 
owned the copyright in the film. However, there was also little 
doubt that the film incorporated large copyrighted parts of the novel 
(such as its plot).157 Rohauer therefore argued that his ownership of 
the copyright in the novel was sufficient to prevent broadcast of the 
film.158 
The court disagreed. Emphasizing that the film-maker had 
invested far more in creating the work than an owner of a renewal 
right who acquired it solely by surviving the original author of the 
novel, the court found that where a copyright had been established 
in a derivative work lawfully created by license during the original 
term, the invalidity of the license in the renewal term due to the 
untimely demise of the original author could not prevent continued 
exploitation of the derivative work.159 Acknowledging that its 
finding didn’t precisely match the text of the statute, the court 
claimed that the statute’s ambiguity, together with compelling 
policy reasons, pointed towards viewing the creation of the 
derivative work as the creation of a broad property right that could 
override the rights of the owner of the renewal term.160 As Nimmer 
unhappily summarized what he called the “new property rights 
theory” at the heart of the case, “once a derivative [or collective] 
work is created pursuant to a valid license to use the underlying 
material, a new property right springs into existence with respect to 
the entire derivative work, so that even if the license is thereafter 
terminated, the proprietor of the derivative work may nevertheless 
continue to use the material from the underlying work as contained 
in the derivative [or collective] work.”161 
The Supreme Court overturned the Second Circuit’s Rohauer 
ruling in the 1990 case Stewart v. Abend.162 Stewart v. Abend 
involved the fate of the famous 1954 Alfred Hitchcock movie Rear 
Window, starring Jimmy Stewart. The movie was based on a 1942 
short story by Cornell Woolrich, entitled “It Had to Be a 
Murder.”163 Woolrich had sold motion picture rights to the short 
story for both the original and renewal terms to BG De Sylva 
Productions;164 eventually the rights were purchased from De 
Sylva’s successors in interest by Alfred Hitchcock’s and Jimmy 
 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 487. 
159 Id. at 492-94. 
160 Id.. 
161 NIMMER, supra note 140 at § 3.07. 
162 495 U.S. 207 (1990). 
163 Id. at 211-12. 
164 Id. at 212. 
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Stewart’s company Patron.165 Unfortunately, Woolrich died in 
1968, without getting the opportunity to renew the copyright. 
Woolrich’s transfer of the renewal term was thus ineffective 
(because Woolrich had never owned it), and ownership of the 
renewal term fell to the executor of the estate, and, ultimately, to 
Sheldon Abend.166 The movie Rear Window came out in 1954, 
during the initial term of copyright, and therefore was solidly within 
the terms of Hitchcock’s and Stewart’s right to create and exploit 
the derivative work during the copyright’s initial period of 
protection (1942-1970). However, in 1971, ABC television 
broadcast Rear Window on the basis of a license from Stewart and 
Hitchcock.167 Abend objected. According to Abend, while Stewart 
and Hitchcock rightly owned the copyright in Rear Window, there 
were plot elements of the movie that came from the short story, and 
those elements were not part of the Rear Window copyright, but, 
rather, part of the short story copyright.168 Abend claimed that as 
the owner of the copyright in the short story during the renewal 
term, he had the right to prevent any broadcasting of the plot 
elements in any form, including in the form of a legitimately created 
derivative work.169 
Rejecting the reasoning of Rohauer, the Supreme Court sided 
with Abend. The Court found that nothing in the language of the 
copyright act granted any rights to the owners of follow-on works 
to continue using material within the copyright of the original work 
without permission.170 The Court brushed aside policy arguments, 
saying “[t]hese arguments are better addressed by Congress than the 
courts.”171 
Congress did not take long. Only two years after the Court’s 
ruling in Stewart v. Abend, Congress enacted the Copyright 
Renewal Act of 1992, which provides in relevant part that "If an 
application to register a claim to the renewed and extended term of 
copyright in a work is not made within 1 year before the expiration 
of the original term of copyright in a work, or if the claim pursuant 
to such application is not registered, then a derivative work prepared 
under authority of a grant of a transfer or license of the copyright 
that is made before the expiration of the original term of copyright 
may continue to be used under the terms of the grant during the 
renewed and extended term of copyright without infringing the 






169 Id. at 212-14. 
170 Id. at 223. 
171 Id. at 228. 
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during such renewed and extended term of other derivative works 
based upon the copyrighted work covered by such grant.”172 
This turgid provision, appearing today in section 304(a)(4)(A) 
of the Copyright Act, partially reverses the ruling in Stewart v. 
Abend and partially restores the rule of Rohauer v. Killian. 
However, the reversal only applies in a narrow set of cases—in 
cases where the owner of the renewal term failed to file the required 
forms, and instead relied upon the Copyright Act’s automatic 
renewal for works published between the years of 1964 and 1977.173 
In that narrow set of cases, anyone who made a properly licensed 
derivative work during the original term of protection could 
continue to use it during the renewal term as if the grant for the 
original term remained in force throughout the renewal term.174 In 
all other cases, the ruling in Stewart v. Abend continues to apply.175 
B. Terminations 
A related instance in which copyright law has incorporated 
protections for the durability and marketability of follow-on works 
can be found in the law of terminations. 
As we noted, the 1976 Copyright Act replaced the two-term 
copyright protection of previous versions of the copyright act with 
a unitary term.176 In doing so, the 1976 Copyright Act ensured that 
legal difficulties associated with renewal terms would gradually 
disappear, since copyrighted works created after the effective date 
of January 1, 1978 would not require renewal (Old works continued 
to have a renewal term, but renewal became automatic.177). This 
reform ought greatly to have simplified questions of ownership. It 
did not. 
While phasing out the renewal term, Congress created a new 
mechanism for undoing copyright transfers. The copyright act now 
allows authors (or their designated successors) to terminate most 
transfers and to regain the copyright after a certain period of time.178 
The termination rules are exceptionally complex, requiring notice 
to be served upon transferees two to ten years before the precise 
date of termination, which must fall within a statutorily defined 
five-year window. The statute creates six different ways to calculate 
the five-year window, depending on the date of the transfer, whether 
 
172 Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264 (1992).  
173 For discussion, see Lowy, supra note 151 at 468-69 (“The main purpose of 
the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 is to provide a system of automatic renewal 
of copyrights.”).  
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). 
177 Lowy, supra note 151. 
178 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). 
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the work was published, and whether the transfer had previously 
been eligible for termination.179 
Generally, the aim of the scheme is described as openly 
paternalistic—to give authors the opportunity to resell copyrights 
after having already sold them a first time.180 On this view, authors 
benefit by being forced to sell fewer rights in an initial transaction 
so they can then sell the remaining rights in a later transaction, after 
the market for the copyrighted work has fully developed (or 
disappeared).181 A different explanation for the termination rules 
focuses on the windfall created by the extended terms created by 
the reform of copyright rules.182 Together, the 1976 act and the later 
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 retroactively 
extended the duration of copyright rights by as much as thirty-seven 
years.183 These extensions bestowed a windfall on the owners of 
valuable copyrights. Termination rights permit authors to seize a 
part or all of the windfall from transferees, in a situation where 
neither anticipated the future windfall at the time of the initial 
transfer. 
As with the ownership rules of renewal terms, termination 
rights create the potential for a clash between owners of rights in 
the original work, and owners of rights in a lawfully-created follow-
on work. It is possible, for example, for a comic book author to sell 
to a movie studio all motion picture rights, and, then, many years 
later, for the author to terminate the sale, and recover all the 
previously transferred rights in the comic book.184 If, in the 
meantime, the movie studio had made several movies on the basis 
of the rights it had purchased, the studio would still own copyright 
in the film, but it would be unable to use the films, because the films 
would naturally incorporate characters, plot lines, and even 
dialogue from the comic books. 
Congress, however, took greater notice of the potential clash 
than it did with respect to renewal terms. Section 304(c)(6)(A) of 
the Copyright Act provides that “[a] derivative work prepared under 
authority of the grant before its termination may continue to be 
utilized under the terms of the grant after its termination, but this 
 
179 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 304(c)-(d). 
180 See, e.g.,, NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 6 (2008). 
181 Lydia Pallas Loren, Renegotiating the Copyright Deal in the Shadow of the 
‘Inalienable’ Right to Terminate, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1329 (2010). 
182 See NIMMER, supra note 140 at §11.02. 
183 Id. 
184 Cf. Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119 (concerning attempted 
termination by the children of comic book artist Jack Kirby of transfer to Marvel 
of rights in characters such as Spider-Man, the Fantastic Four, and the X-Men); 
Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1114 (C.D. Cal. 2008), 
(concerning attempted termination by Superman creators  Jerry Siegel and Joe 
Shuster of transfer of rights to Superman). 
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privilege does not extend to the preparation after the termination of 
other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work covered by 
the terminated grant.”185 The result of this provision is that if the 
lawfully-created follow-on work is a derivative work, as the term is 
defined by the copyright, the owner of the follow-on work should 
prevail in a clash with the owner of the original rights. The owner 
of the follow-on work, and other lawful licensees of the follow-on 
work, will be able to continue using the work, so long as they abide 
by the terms of the pre-termination grant. 
C. Restored Copyright 
A third situation in which the problems associated with 
transitory personal rights has arisen is in cases of “restored 
copyrights.” Restored copyrights are the result of a pair of laws 
adopted by Congress as part of the United States’ accession to the 
Berne Convention: the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 
1988186 (effective date March 1, 1989), in which the United States 
joined the Berne Convention, and the Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act of 1994187 (effective date January 1, 1995), in which the U.S. 
amended its copyright law in various ways to fall into line with legal 
standards demanded by international trade treaties. The new laws 
granted retroactive copyright protection to foreign works that had 
enjoyed copyright protection in other countries, but were not 
protected in the United States due to their failure to abide by legal 
formalities that were once part of the law, but are no longer — such 
as the requirement to place proper copyright notice on every 
published copy.188 The laws created a category of “restored 
copyrights” — copyrights in works that had spent years or decades 
in the public domain in the United States, but, as of January 1, 1996, 
found themselves “restored” to the hands of the original author.189 
To understand how restored copyrights work, consider the 
following example. Alexis Author, a resident of London, wrote and 
published a novel called Good England, in London, in 1955. In 
1958, Alexis Author authorized American Publishers, Inc. to sell 
copies of the novel in the United States; unfortunately, American 
Publishers failed to include the copyright notice in each copy 
 
185 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A). 
186 Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) [hereinafter “Berne Convention 
Implementation Act”]. 
187 Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4976 (1994) [hereinafter “Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act”]. 
188 Tung Yin, Reviving Fallen Copyrights: A Constitutional Analysis of Section 
514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. J. 383, 
384 (1997). 
189 See NIMMER, supra note 140 at § 9A.04. 
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required by U.S. law at the time.190 Publication without notice in 
1958 thus stripped the novel of any copyright protection in the 
United States, even though the novel continued to enjoy copyright 
protection in Britain. Section 104A of the Copyright Act (as 
rewritten by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994)191 
automatically restored Alexis Author’s rights to Good England in 
the United States as of January 1, 1996; Alexis’s U.S. rights in her 
novel will therefore remain in force for 95 years, through 2053. 
Restored copyrights have the potential to pose problems for 
follow-on works created during the period where the work lacked 
copyright protection. Consider what would happen if in the above 
example involving Alexis Author’s British novel, the American 
company, Movie Studios, Inc. decided to make a film version of 
Good England in 1960, during the period when the novel Good 
England was in the public domain in the United States. Obviously, 
in 1960, Movie Studios would not need any sort of license to create 
its movie, since the novel was in the public domain at the time. 
However, after January 1, 1996, any public showing of the movie 
would necessarily involve a public performance of those parts of 
the novel incorporated in the film. As in the cases of derivative 
works in the renewal term, or after termination, the film would be a 
follow-on work that had been lawfully created but could no longer 
be lawfully used. 
In the case of restored copyrights, the problem did not escape 
the notice of Congress. Section 104A specifically addresses the case 
of “reliance parties”—parties who relied on the public domain 
status of the work prior to the restoration of copyright to engage in 
actions that would be copyright infringements had the works been 
protected, and who continued to engage in such actions after 
restoration of the copyright.192 The statute gives reliance parties 
certain rights to continue using the work in ways that would 
otherwise be seen as infringements: a statutory license to continue 
using derivative works,193 and a grace period for other uses.194 
The grace period is for a one-year period, but the onset of the 
period is not the date of copyright restoration. Rather, the grace 
period begins when the reliance party receives notice (or is 
 
190 Id. at §§ 7.02-7.03. 
191 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 104A. 
192 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 104A. 
193 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 104A (d)(3)(A)(ii) (“… a reliance party 
may continue to exploit that derivative work for the duration of the restored 
copyright if the reliance party pays to the owner of the restored copyright 
reasonable compensation for conduct which would be subject to a remedy for 
infringement…”). 
194 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 104A (d)(2)(B) (outlining a 12- month 
grace period for reliance parties after notice is given of intent to restore a 
copyright). 
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constructively put on notice) that the restored copyright owner 
intends to enforce her rights.195 During the one-year grace period, 
the reliance party can continue to use the work in ways that would 
be considered infringing, including distributing, performing and 
displaying the work, and authorizing others to do the same.196 
Derivative works based upon a work with restored copyright 
enjoy even more rights. As long as the derivative work was created 
a sufficient time before restoration (before the effective of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, or, in certain cases, before the 
joining of the Berne Convention and other treaties by the foreign 
country source of the restored work), reliance parties can continue 
using the derivative work indefinitely, without permission of the 
owner of the restored copyright.197 The statute simply requires that 
the reliance party pay compensation to the owner of the restored 
copyright. If the parties cannot agree on compensation, courts are 
instructed to set a rate that reflects “any harm to the actual or 
potential market for or value of the restored work from the reliance 
party’s continued exploitation of the work, as well as compensation 
for the relative contributions of expression of the author of the 
restored work and the reliance party to the derivative work.”198 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we call for a radical transformation in the fair 
use doctrine—not in determining when uses are “fair,” but, rather, 
in delineating the scope of the protection afforded by fair use 
findings. Today, fair use is personal and individualized. A fair use 
ruling helps only the individual defendant who was sued for 
copyright infringement and protects only the challenged use or uses 
by that defendant. Her victory does not carry over to others who 
receive permission to use her work that incorporates the fair use. 
We call for the introduction of a new fair use conception modelled 
as a property incident. The property version of fair use would 
provide immunity to any third party who uses derivative works that 
fairly incorporate copyrighted content with permission from the fair 
user. Fair use rulings would benefit all those that lawfully use, 
perform, distribute and adapt follow-on works in which copyrighted 
content is fairly embedded (i.e., incorporated by right of fair use). 
Downstream users of the follow-on work would no longer need to 




197 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 104A (d)(2)(B) (outlining a 12- month 
grace period for reliance parties after notice is given of intent to restore a 
copyright). 
198 Id. 
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work; it would suffice for them to obtain a license from the fair user 
who created the follow-on work. 
Implementation of our proposal would give courts broad 
discretion to decide which fair use, if any, to recognize in cases 
brought before them. To assist courts, we propose two default rules 
that would apply when courts fail to specify which of the two fair 
use conceptions it has selected. In cases involving derivative works 
that incorporate preexisting copyright content, the property version 
of fair use should apply and run to subsequent users of the derivative 
work. In other cases, the traditional, in personam version should 
govern. Courts would retain the discretion to diverge from the 
default rules, by, for example, creating an in personam fair use for 
a derivative work. The reform we propose would benefit not only 
users, but also creators who fairly rely on preexisting materials as it 
would dramatically enhance the marketability, and thus the value, 
of their works. The proposal is fully consistent with the general 
trend in copyright law to protect marketability even at the expense 
of the veto power of the original work owner. At the same time, our 
remedy respects the judicial autonomy that has traditionally 
characterized fair use rulings. 
Copyright law is not exclusively concerned with the production 
of original expressive content; it also seeks to promote the use of 
works after they have been created. One of the central purposes of 
fair use to doctrine is to ensure such future use. Without reform, the 
fair use doctrine cannot afford adequate protection to user interests. 
We submit that our proposed reform would follow in the footsteps 
of similar accommodations already made by copyright law to 
protect the rights and interests of follow-on users and creators. An 
in rem conception of fair use that exists alongside the traditional in 
personam fair use privilege can bring about an improved balance in 
copyright law between the rights of creators and those of follow-on 
users. 
 
